IMPERIAL SUBJECTS

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Imperial Subjects

RACE AND IDENTITY IN

COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA

Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O'Hara, eds.

Foreword by Irene Silverblatt

Duke University Press
Durham and London 2009

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A. B. F.

For Debbie and Gabriel

M. D. O.

For Sue, Maeve, Bridgid, and Farrin

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Foreword

Taken collectively the chapters in this volume make a strong statement about the relevance of identity to the study of the Iberian (mostly Spanish) colonial world. They also make a strong case for a particular view of identity—one that understands the concept as fluid, malleable, yet constrained; one that understands identity as being born out of a dynamic between individuals and the givens of cultural and political life—the relations of being—through which humans make themselves and succeeding conditions of experience. That is, they insist on studying identity in history.

And that history was quite extraordinary, for Spanish colonialism was coterminous with the initial processes of European state making. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, witnessing profound transformations in political and economic life, spawned nothing less than a cultural revolution—or, better said, a revolution in the possible ways of being human. This was a revolution of identities—a revolution of social selves, of social relations, and of social understandings; this was the cultural revolution behind the making of the emerging modern world.

One of the emerging modern world's signature behaviors was to embed economic and political authority into a radical cultural design. Spanish political and economic dominion was charted through a novel trio of human beings—*español*, *indio*, and *negro* (to be expanded as the categories proved insufficient)—each with a publicly conferred configuration of obligations and possibilities. These categories contributed to the ambience of political culture through which human beings, in daily living, gave meaning to themselves and their lives. Taken as a whole, the essays here explore how structures of colonial rule were transformed into venues of lived experience, were transformed into identities.

In the colonial world, aspects of identity were in dialogue with categories of rule—the categories through which the Crown governed its population. Institutions of political and religious life—the bureaucracies of church and state—circumscribed individuals by placing them in colonialism's definitional boxes. Although these categories were implanted into the sinews of living, state and religious institutions did not have the only say—or even the final say. These categories were frames of cultural possibility; but it was individuals, in history, living through social relations, that made them into structures of experience.

I stress again the importance of seeing these chapters as part of a whole, more comprehensive project. The kind of wide-ranging lens provided by this volume points to the analytical advantage of abstractions like "identity" and "race" but it also lays bare their limits. If one of the messages of this volume is the importance of studying identity dialectally, as a dynamic relation between a subject and the social forms and practices of a given milieu, another is the importance of history, of exploring identity in terms of the context through which identities are created, transformed, and maintained. We can draw lessons about the nature of identity—or, better, of identities—only by analyzing their varieties over lifetimes, over decades, and over geographies. Then we can see how relations of power, in a variety of spheres, tinge the air in which identities breathe.

If we are to think about race and identity not as things but as processes of living, a turn to Iberian colonialism is particularly helpful. One reason is that the first waves of colonialism inaugurated the global, racialized categories of humanity with which we are only too familiar today. We are forced to recognize that these divisions had a historical genesis and that their construction was party to the politics making the modern world and its illusions.

Western mythology, described by Fernando Coronil as "occidentalism," masked the roots of Western nation building in global politics. Contrary to common understandings, the modern world, from its inception, was transnational in scope and hierarchical in structure. These characteristics are evident in the categories of Spanish colonialism, constructed to politically order the newly globalized humanity. Notions of "Spanishness" were emerging in Europe at the same time that colonizers were civilizing Indians, enslaving Africans, and distinguishing themselves

from the lower orders of Indians and blacks by calling one another "Spanish." Exploring Spanish expansion allows us to better grasp the significance of colonialism to what we call "modernity" as well as the antagonistic social relationships—racialized relationships—at its core.

Bureaucrats control knowledge, and, as social analysts have pointed out, this authority is a source of their power. But many colonial bureaucrats dominated a special kind of knowledge: they could determine the most profound of societal truths—membership in a human community. Seventeenth-century functionaries inherited a world whose humanity was increasingly understood in racialized, colonially driven terms. With the authority to determine the categorical "box" in which human beings were placed, officials played a significant (if unwitting) role in deepening and consolidating race-thinking as a way of life. In their bureaucratic practices, officials were specifying the very terms of social experience: the terms by which the world was to be judged and the terms framing any individual's social truth. Essays in this volume shed light on this process of identity-naming and, taken collectively, they locate identity in history, by highlighting the interaction of identity with structures of power.

Administrators in Spain and Spain's colonies used a particular race-thinking notion to shape and calibrate the "natural order" of political life. They argued that blood carried stains, and that stains could determine character traits, intelligence, political rights, and economic possibilities. The notion of blood purity was first elaborated in Europe, where it was used to separate Old Christians from Spain's New Christians—women and men of Jewish and Muslim origin whose ancestors had converted to Christianity. New Christians carried stained blood and, consequently, were perceived as a potential danger to official life. Conquistadores brought the curse of New Christians, the concept of stained blood (*mancha*), to the Americas. Bureaucrats were obliged to indicate the "race" and blood purity of everyone brought before them; their records give us a ringside view of the New Christian dilemma in the New World. Authorities in the Americas were vexed by such blood-related questions as Was the blood stain of Europe's New Christians the same as the blood stain of Indians or blacks? Were such stains indelible? Could baptism override them? Were all stains equal? When bureaucrats and their colleagues responded to these issues in their daily chores of statecraft, they helped

make race into a calculable thing. They were also imbuing "race" with very modern, often state-related, confusions—of nation and religion, culture and genes, color and ability.

The essays in this rich and varied collection point to the confused, overlapping, and muddied dimensions of identitymaking in the Spanish colonial world; they point to the dialectic conjoining public dimensions of colonial order, expressed through cultural designs, and the ways that human beings, born into this world, gave meaning to, made sense of, and in the process (unwittingly) put their stamp on the racialized orders of colonial life. By providing us with abundant examples—crossing boundaries of time and geography—they give us a perspective on the broad historical processes, mixing cultural forms and political ordering, that have shaped not only the Spanish colonial world but so much of modern experience.

Thus, domination, in its many forms, was overlaid on a radical, cultural map of social being; moreover, the exploitative social relations girding this global cultural map were hidden behind a semblance of categorical "race" things.

Irene Silverblatt

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Acknowledgments

Edited volumes are by definition a collective effort, yet this project owes an especially great debt to others. Well before the project's inception, our advisers and fellow graduate students at the University of California, San Diego, greatly influenced our thinking about Latin American history, its changing historiography on race and identity, and the place of analytic frameworks in historical interpretation. In particular, we wish to express our gratitude to our graduate mentors, Eric Van Young and Dain Borges.

In 2004–2005, we began a series of informal conversations stemming from our surprise that topics as central to the field of colonial Latin American history as race and identity had not been the subject of a book such as this one (with the exception of some well-known but rather dated syntheses published several decades ago). Holed up in a hotel room in downtown Seattle during the American Historical Association's annual meeting, we outlined a plan for bringing such a volume to fruition in the hope of offering not only a representative sampling of current scholarship but also an anticipation of the field's future direction. The result of those initial musings is this book.

Academic folklore abounds with ominous tales of edited book projects that never quite got off the ground or were mired for years somewhere in the middle of the editorial process, consuming in the process the life-blood of those foolhardy enough to take on the helm. We are glad to report that our experience could not have been more different. Above all, we have our contributors to thank for the project's success. Their intelligent, crisp, and (almost always!) timely drafts filled our journey with a deep sense of scholarly purpose. Likewise, the encouragement and support that we received at Duke University Press from Valerie Millholland and Miriam Angress made the editorial process a breeze. Irene Silverblatt

and Doug Cope also merit a special note of gratitude for their support and enthusiasm for the project while it was still at its conceptual stage.

As editors, we were privileged to orchestrate a series of cordial yet lively exchanges of ideas among such an exemplary group of scholars. We believe the work as a whole benefited from the cross-pollination that occurred through the circulation of early versions of the book's chapters. Our own introductory essay certainly improved thanks to the insights of a number of the volume's contributors, as well as those of our friend and colleague Javier Villa-Flores. On behalf of everyone involved in the project, we would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers who offered feedback for how to strengthen the internal cohesion and interpretative force of the final product.

Last, we would not have found the time to complete this project had it not been for the generous support offered by our home institutions and a number of external grants over the course of several years. In particular, Andrew Fisher thanks Carleton College for an extended leave from teaching and the Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego. For his part, Matt O'Hara thanks the History Department and the Division of Humanities at the University of California at Santa Cruz, the History Department at New Mexico State University, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Newberry Library, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

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ANDREW B. FISHER AND MATTHEW D. O'HARA

Introduction

Racial Identities and Their Interpreters in Colonial Latin America

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In today's parlance, the New World has lost most of its value as a historically useful term. Critics most commonly point out that what Columbus "discovered" was not new to the millions of indigenous people whose ancestors had lived in the western hemisphere for millennia prior to 1492. To question the novelty of the "New World" is no longer a radical critique but a baseline assumption. The more significant conceptual problem is that the term privileges a precise (even pristine) condition captured at a particular moment in time. Precontact America was not, after all, populated by timeless societies beyond the bounds of history, nor was there a clear and universal endpoint for the many repercussions unleashed on what would become the Atlantic world in the aftermath of 1492. The colonial societies that coalesced in early Latin America, in

other words, remained ever-changing and multiple new worlds that could be just as alien to indigenous people as they were for European and African newcomers.[1] Seemingly impersonal historical forces—such as the introduction and spread of Hispanic culture and Catholicism, mercantile capitalism, and the transatlantic slave trade, among others—certainly played an important role in the shaping of these societies, and as a consequence they helped create the opportunities, resources, perils, and limitations the people of early Latin America faced on a daily basis. But, as the contributors to this volume show, colonial reality was also formed by the cumulative effect of an infinite number of interactions, both mundane and extraordinary, among Spain's and Portugal's diverse set of imperial subjects. While historians can readily discern evidence of the material forces that shaped the colonial experience—where people worked, the goods they consumed, and the taxes they paid—it is often more difficult to assess affective experience, such as how historical actors understood their sense of self or their attachment to a place or community. At its core, this volume seeks to unlock this fundamental question of how Iberian settlers, African slaves, Native Americans, and their multiethnic progeny understood who they were as individuals, as members of various communities, and ultimately as imperial subjects. More specifically, it explores the relationship between colonial ideologies of difference and the identities historical actors presented, performed, and defended in their interactions with one another and the representatives of the twin bastions of imperial rule, the Crown and the Church. It is an attempt to understand the inseparable bond between public and private realities.

While the question of identity may appear to be an intrinsically personal inquiry, it carries a political dimension that relates directly to the nature of Iberian imperialism. That is, although it has long been asserted that Spanish and Portuguese colonization tolerated racial miscegenation to a degree unimaginable in the British (and to a lesser extent, French) worlds, the Iberian project in the Americas rested on the presumption of a long-term, discernible boundary between the colonizers and the colonized that reflected a sliding scale of inferiority among subsets of the Crown's vassals.[2] Royal jurists and advisors thus justified empire in part by appealing to their nations' historic mission to bring civilization and the Catholic faith to a heathen and barbaric indigenous population. In exchange for these benefits, the newly ascribed "Indians" were expected to

offer their fealty, labor, and tribute to the monarch and his representatives. In Spanish America, this reciprocal relationship, summarized in Karen Caplan's chapter in this volume, went further, by offering a modicum of protection to these new subjects as legal minors of the Crown. Reality, though, often diverged dramatically from the espoused ideal, particularly in the early colonial period, prompting the introduction of African slaves to the colonies so as to spare the rapidly declining indigenous population from the severest form of exploitation. Consigned to the status of chattel and a life of grueling labor, Africans and their American-born descendants did not initially enjoy a paternalistic connection to the Crown. Nevertheless, as the chapters by Dantas, Díaz, and Twinam in this volume attest, free and enslaved blacks, as they became familiar with Hispanic culture and Iberian law, began to assert an identity as imperial subjects entitled to rights, honors, and privileges that colonial society did not readily concede to those associated with the stigma of slavery and an inferior racial status.

Despite this ideological premise, colonial realities often required transgressing boundaries of difference. Early on, for instance, Spanish and Portuguese men learned that securing power and economic resources was made easier through marriages, or more commonly informal liaisons, with the daughters of indigenous rulers.[3] In some instances, the Crown even encouraged such strategies in the belief that Spanish traits could "redeem" Indian ones in the resulting progeny.[4] More mundane demographic forces yielded similar though largely unintended outcomes. For one, the dearth of Spanish and Portuguese women, particularly in the early years of colonization, induced all sorts of male settlers to seek out temporary or permanent relations of varying degrees of coercion with indigenous women that went well beyond the scope of strategic elite unions.[5] An even more skewed and longer-lasting gender imbalance among African slaves—exacerbated by competition between black men and white owners for enslaved female companions—also led to high rates of exogamy among this group. Iberian law, which considered a child's civil status inherited from the mother, further encouraged enslaved black men to seek out Indian and mestiza wives. In all these instances, it was not immediately clear how the resulting children were to be characterized, although many were probably automatically accorded their mother's status given the absence of an acknowledged (or even known) father. Chil-

dren born from indigenous mothers and notable Spanish fathers constituted the most noteworthy exception, since they frequently gained honorary membership in the "superior" group. In time, however, new intermediate categories (for example, mestizo and mulatto) emerged to address the liminal status of interracial children. The elite viewed these groups with suspicion and distaste, especially as their numbers grew. The fact that these unions occurred outside the bounds of Christian matrimony, and among lower-status individuals, only contributed to the belief that racially heterogeneous individuals lacked honor and legitimacy and possibly carried the stain of black ancestry.[6] Racial ambiguity, in sum, has deep roots in Latin American history that have been informed by unequal relations of power across group boundaries and gender lines.

Given these entrenched ideological assumptions about the colonial order, it is no wonder that the state and those groups with an interest in the status quo viewed with suspicion and hostility any challenges to the fixed and "natural" boundaries between different sorts of people. These attitudes were perhaps best embodied by the so-called Two Republic system of Spanish America, a sprawling collection of royal legislation, local administrative policies, and informal practices, through which Spanish colonizers attempted to separate native peoples from other colonial subjects. These included restrictions against non-Indians living in Indian towns, distinct systems of religious administration for native peoples, and separate juridical institutions for Indians and non-Indians. While historians now recognize that the Two Republics composed a "system" only as a theoretical abstraction, and even then an imperfect one, the on-again off-again efforts to resurrect it betrayed a long-term Iberian preoccupation with social mixture. Therefore, consternation over intermingling, whether of a linguistic, residential, or sexual manner, such as that registered in Philip II's *auto* cited above, was a constant motif voiced by imperial spokesmen in Iberia and the Americas throughout the duration of colonial rule.[7] Hostility toward the crossing of perceived racial boundaries was not an imperial monopoly, however. Members of the indigenous elite, such as Felipe Guaman Poma, could also be critical of a world perceived as "upside-down," especially as it related to the erosion of their own class and gender privileges.[8] For such individuals, cultural and ethnic diversity were phenomena to be reversed rather than embraced. Elite and state preoccupations aside, the colonial societies that

emerged in Latin America were increasingly characterized by fluidity and creativity that could not be bounded by mandate or social taboo. Clumsy efforts to classify racial and ethnic diversity, such as the Spanish *sistema de castas*, which comprised a series of elaborate social categories based primarily on an individual's descent and lineage, may have allayed a few colonists but the finer granularities of social categorization often held little significance in daily life.[9]

In light of these Iberian preoccupations about social difference, historians of the Americas have long recognized that the physical encounters that began in the late fifteenth century between Europeans, Africans, and Amerindians were also encounters of the mind, whereby preexisting cognitive frameworks for interpreting social difference came into contact, often violently, and as a result changed irrevocably. Not surprisingly, European ideas about the Americas and its inhabitants tend to receive the most attention, since they form the lion's share of the historical record on the topic.[10] Many colonists, theologians, and jurists interpreted the early Latin American reality through the prism of an Iberian tradition that crystallized over centuries of interaction and conflict among Christians, Muslims, and Jews. While all three faiths ultimately traced their origins to the patriarch Abraham, an ideology of purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*) gradually coalesced, which posited that fundamental, even if intangible, differences divided the members of the three religious communities, and that one generation passed down these qualities to the next. These ideas were fully formed by the advent of Iberian oceanic expansion and thus played a critical role in shaping attitudes toward difference and the guiding spirit of colonial law (perhaps most visibly in the concept of distinct Indian and Spanish "republics"). Indeed, such concepts continued to inform twentieth-century debates regarding the nature and origins of Spanish nationalism.[11]

How these inchoate ideas about difference reassembled into colonial (and later modern) notions of racial disparity has generated a great deal of interest among historians. One important facet of this inquiry concerns the question of the relative importance of racial ideas in the development of African slavery in the Americas. While the prominent West Indian historian Eric Williams posited in the 1940s that the enslavement of Africans rested initially on economic considerations (that is, African slaves were the cheapest option available to planters), with beliefs in

racial inferiority coming later, more recent studies have argued that prejudicial images of blacks had a much longer genealogy among western Europeans than previously thought. That the enslavement of other more readily available Europeans was never pursued as a viable option by imperial powers further suggests that the path toward African slavery was indeed informed as much by emerging ideas of group difference in Europe as it was by impersonal market forces.[12] By the 1960s, Marxist-inspired scholars began to formulate explanations of the origins of racial categorization that extended well beyond the topic of slavery.[13] These historians and social scientists sought to identify a correlation between the development of racial ideology and a wider array of coercive labor practices in the Americas that developed on the heels of European expansion and what some consider a nascent capitalist world economy. In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, race (and racism) thus became "the expression, the promoter, and the consequence of the geographical concentrations associated with the axial division of labor" that reflected a global hierarchy of different structures of production.[14] Challenges to Wallerstein's world-system approach, partly shaped by similar responses to earlier dependency theory, raised significant questions concerning whether early Latin American economic and social reality fit models of peripheral capitalism, but even critics generally agreed that comparable forces contributed to the formation of enduring racial ideologies. The historian Steve J. Stern, himself a critic of Wallerstein's model, thus concluded in his study of early Peruvian society that "colonialism created 'Indians,' and defined them as "an inferior, degraded race." By this statement Stern described not just an elite ideological formulation but rather a set of circumstances—poverty, exploitation, and an internalization of the colonial norm—that shaped the lives of native peoples and informed their very understanding of their place in the imposed colonial order.[15]

While these questions remain largely with us, a more fundamental point to take from this rich body of work is that racial discourse has always been a product of specific cultural and historical contexts. Perhaps most obviously, to equate Iberian obsession over blood purity with nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories of race would risk obscuring more than it illuminates.[16] Even fairly "obvious" markers of difference, such as phenotype, map out in extraordinarily different ways across time and space. To be labeled black, for instance, in the U.S. South during the

height of Jim Crow involved a different set of criteria than, say, those deemed most relevant in contemporary (let alone colonial) Brazil. Recognizing the perils of applying a term like race, so hopelessly entangled in nineteenth- and twentieth-century resonances, to early-modern Latin America highlights a critical set of theoretical and methodological conundrums. At the heart of the matter is the question of terminology. Namely, historians must grapple with how to translate into modern meaning and parlance the elaborate system of nomenclature that developed to signify difference in colonial Latin America. That the meaning of this vocabulary shifted across time and space only complicates an already thorny predicament. To cite just one example, colonial law in Spanish America referenced categories such as "Indian" (*indio*) and "black" (*negro*) so frequently and reflexively as to suggest that jurists and others understood these terms as effective generalizations that could render a semblance of order to an admittedly more complex social reality. But, which factors were the most crucial in assigning particular people or groups to a given category? As David Tavárez's chapter on the Mexican Inquisition demonstrates, the answer often proved far from straightforward for officials, let alone other subjects.

Apart from their individual meanings, the problem of translation complicates efforts to interpret the ideologies behind colonial terminology. To return to the previous example, should these legal abstractions and formulations about phenotype and descent be understood as the expressions of a "racial" ideology, or something quite different? Or, to express the corollary, did historical actors understand the differences between themselves and others as something akin to modern-day notions of race? For a variety of reasons, which we explore in greater detail below, historians have increasingly answered no to both questions. This response is partly due to a growing appreciation of how historical actors understood difference in the distant past, but it also relates to changing academic sensibilities toward the categories we use when interpreting and describing that history. Let us tackle the latter question first. The debunking of race as a scientific discourse during the course of the twentieth century led many in the academic community to shift discussion of social difference to the analytic categories of ethnicity or identity, terms that are perceived as more value-free, or at least more clearly divorced from the eugenics nightmare that culminated in the Nazi movement and the Holocaust.

Identity, in particular, has proven to be especially alluring to Latin Americanists given contemporary developments and preoccupations. Academics have been keen to examine, for example, the impact of the current phase of globalization on the region and the attendant proliferation of "hybrid" cultures that presumably transcend national identities and boundaries. The dramatic reshaping of Latin America's post–Cold War political landscape away from class-based organization and mobilization toward an explicitly ethnic struggle centered on the demands for a plurinational state has also contributed to this shift within the academy.[17]

Of course, as with any analytic category, ethnicity and identity are imperfect tools. Even more so than the modern notion of race, their intellectual genealogies are distinct from the ideological milieu of early Latin America that they purport to describe and explain.[18] Perhaps the most critical concern alleged by critics, though, is that both terms, again like race, cannot be defined with sufficient precision, a point we will return to momentarily. Indeed, the fact that, as Peter Wade has shown, indigenous groups have long been studied in terms of ethnicity and blacks in terms of race (under the erroneous assumption that the former status is defined by fluid cultural signifiers and the latter by more fixed phenotypical ones) only highlights the treacherous waters any poorly conceived categorization can stir up.[19] On the other hand, they do offer a decided advantage over their predecessor in that they signal more clearly the situational and constructed nature of self and group formation that race, with all its associations with fixed and "natural" qualities, is less capable of managing. In other words, ethnicity and identity are most commonly used today to stress the cognitive and cultural dimensions behind the construction of difference (and sameness), a proposition more difficult for an overtly biologically determinative model of race.[20]

We caution, however, against misconstruing this constructed quality as intrinsically artificial or necessarily intentional. Identities are performed before others, but this social dimension does not deny the importance of other private (even subconscious) aspects formed a priori through socialization and key formative experiences in an individual's life.[21] Critics notwithstanding, we would further suggest that a basic typological difference exists between the two terms that informs our decision to favor identity over ethnicity in this volume. Whereas scholars tend to use ethnicity when describing the relational aspect of intergroup dynamics

(to paraphrase Fredrik Barth, how culture shapes a "them" that helps to define an "us"), identity more commonly connotes a multinodal approach to the construction of personhood that recognizes no primary factor.[22] This is a tremendous aid, for it makes explicit recent critiques of older approaches to the study of race. That is, rather than considering race (or its usual attendants, class and gender) as independent variables, a multinodular model of identity recognizes upfront that all three are universal and dependent variables that intersect and interact with one another.[23] How all these variables are articulated, contested, and enforced, therefore, allows us "to move beyond the recuperation of the historical (and often heroicized) experiences of supposedly marginal groups to establishing how central these categories are to the construction of power (whether political or economic or cultural), meaning and identities at every level of Latin American society."[24]

Along with the related matters of terminology and meaning, the study of identity runs up against a second major theoretical and methodological hurdle. Specifically, how can historians capture the voice and *mentalité* of the colonial subaltern? This problem, of course, is not unique to this field of inquiry. Any project purporting to embrace a "history from below" must confront the question of sources. Granted, all sources must be treated critically, but particular caution must be exercised in those cases where the available documentation is largely texts produced in a setting of unequal power. Reconstituting the "soft tissue" of culture and cognition from the partial and fossilized remains of the historical record is difficult enough to do for the literate and elite strata of colonial society; achieving the same goal for the nonelite, who were often illiterate and thus less likely to have a semblance of their voice recorded for later study, is made that much more difficult.[25] Moreover, for those imperial subjects who drew from a cultural heritage distinct from the dominant Hispanic one (early postcontact indigenous groups are perhaps the most frequently studied) there are the additional challenges of determining how internally defined and colonial markers of differences interacted with one another, and how their use varied depending upon the intended audience.[26] Stated more simply, how are we to understand what subalterns meant when they employed the discourse of difference in reference to themselves and others?

Let us take these interrelated concerns one at a time, starting with the

question of how to impute the normative meanings of colonial classifications of difference. The initial forays by historians into this question focused mostly on identifying the relevant vocabulary and its internal logic. Relying on elite discourse recorded in government decrees (including those against intermixture, such as our first epigraph) and other bureaucratic documentation where attempts at racial categorization were recorded (such as census reports), these pioneering studies traced the evolution of a nomenclature intended to capture the growing demographic complexity of colonial society (most famously embodied in the Spanish sistema de castas). Examining casta categories primarily from a juridical perspective, it is not surprising perhaps that these studies tended, intentionally or not, to favor the elite perspective informed by their sources. The racial or caste-based terminology was thus believed to map out, at least in broad strokes, a social reality, namely a "pigmentocracy" or hierarchy of color that structured colonial societies, most visible through the lens of labor.[27] In essence, ideologies of difference confirmed what historians already suspected about early Latin America: that European- and American-born whites monopolized the upper echelon of society through their positions as officials, merchants, and mine and landowners, while those enjoying partial white ancestry inhabited an intermediate position of employment and status, and blacks or Indians (depending on the specific region) occupied the bottom rung as base labor.[28] That is not to suggest, however, that these early scholars failed to recognize that their sources were fraught with peril. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán's seminal study, published in 1946, of New Spain's black population, for instance, acknowledged quite clearly that the caste system was ultimately an elite construction that often left officials at a loss as to how to apply such a blunt tool to the enormously complicated cultural and biological intermixture that characterized colonial society. Scholars also recognized early on that colonial racial ideologies rested on a fragile demographic reality that only grew more complicated over time, a situation that facilitated the phenomenon of "passing" by which individuals "moved" from one porous racial grouping to another.[29] In a remarkably prescient article published in 1966, one of the leading figures of the field, Magnus Mörner, highlighted many of these critical points, perhaps none more fundamental than that colonial texts "provide a classification that is already as much socially as racially determined." He also called for histo-

rians to pay greater attention to how the caste system evolved over time, and how closely its terminology coincided with economic criteria (in other words, the trappings of class).[30]

Over the next decade or so, understanding of the meaning and function of racial terminology grew as a result of the kind of work that Mörner had suggested. Often buttressing their claims with sophisticated quantitative analysis of census and parish records (the latter usually providing demographic information captured at key moments in the life cycle, especially baptisms, marriages, and burials), scholars reached differing conclusions regarding the nature of social stratification in colonial Latin America. Simplifying the contours of the debate somewhat, some understood a given individual's position within the social hierarchy (reflected in his or her range of available occupations and the possibility of social mobility) as determined principally by some sort of juridical status (variously defined as estate, race, or caste) while others stressed the growing importance of economic criteria (in shorthand, class) by the late colonial period. The latter group thus emphasized a degree of upward and downward mobility as the colonial market matured and expanded, a development that individuals from the former camp did not deny, although they questioned the market's ability to override the racial dynamics of social stratification.[31] Perhaps fittingly, mestizos occupied the most ambiguous socioeconomic position, exhibiting no one dominant occupational pattern in some areas, a conclusion others reached more controversially for mulattoes and creoles, as well.[32]

Admittedly, these studies, and the debate more generally, focused primarily on late-colonial urban areas (principally the cities of New Spain, no less), raising questions as to whether their findings were applicable to rural settings, earlier periods, or even to cities of other regions.[33] Nevertheless, this vein of research led historians to stress even more than before the potential flexibility of colonial racial categories and the only partial correspondence of caste categories to other markers of social status, such as occupation and wealth. In response, some turned to the concept of "social race," or the colonial term *calidad* (as do many of our authors) to capture the multiple factors beyond phenotype (for example, occupation, reputation, language abilities, dress) that qualified an otherwise straightforward "racial" classification.[34] Stated simply, social categories such as indio, negro, or mestizo did not always mean the same thing

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in different social and institutional settings, over the duration of an individual's life, let alone across generations. In an influential study, Patricia Seed concluded that such instances of "racial variability" most commonly involved individuals of multiracial descent (more specifically, mestizos and *castizos*) who held occupations at variance with ingrained assumptions concerning their "group's" place in the colonial economic structure. "The reality of social race," in other words, "was formed by the intersection of the division of labor and the cognitive system of racial labels."[35]

To survey the ground so far covered, we have seen that studying social categories is inherently diachronic (and historical) rather than synchronic (and static). This is true even for case studies with a relatively short periodization, since diachronic comparison is implicit in the analysis of identity formation and boundary definition. In the abstract, such a model of social identity implies some degree of dynamism and agency, that is, some mechanism for historical actors or other forces to change over time the meaning of social nomenclature. Nonetheless, both the earlier studies of caste and more recent and primarily quantitative critiques of that literature did not adequately conceptualize change over time (examining on the one hand, legal codes and decrees that suggested a somewhat timeless caste system and, on the other hand, using sophisticated studies of census records to debunk these earlier claims). The two competing methods functioned as snapshots in time, or in some cases, snapshots over time. They offered empirically rich and insightful analyses of social structures and demographic patterns, yet they did not tackle the way that the interaction of subjects with colonial institutions could produce new meanings for social identities or alter existing ones.

By the 1990s, the class versus caste debate began to make way for new approaches to the study of colonial racial ideologies. Monographic studies reinforced many of the previous findings that emphasized the class dynamic of racial identities, although their focus still remained largely on late-colonial urban settings, and quite often their conclusions were different. For example, Douglas Cope's study of seventeenth-century Mexico City found that racial passing was not a critical concern (or a practical goal) for the plebeian poor whose daily lives more often centered on securing physical and economic survival. Moreover, although colonial categories of difference did map onto the poor's social and kinship networks, *grosso modo*, the principal source of colonial control rested more

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on vertical networks of patronage than horizontal racial divisions.[36] These conclusions cast critical light on many of the assumptions in previous analyses of the caste system, which tended to emphasize its preventive role (keeping nonelite from passing into a "higher" racial status) and the means of subverting subaltern collective acts of resistance.[37] Cope's book was thus particularly influential in that it shifted focus from elite constructions of difference to plebeian reception and understanding of racial terminology.[38] Similar studies of popular notions of difference, and subaltern manipulations of elite ideology, have suggested promising new directions for a cultural analysis of what was beginning to look like an exhausted line of inquiry. In the words of one practitioner, the key is to consider racial categories "as more a discursive resource than reflective of a self-evident structure of society . . . rais[ing] the possibility that so-called 'loose' and apparently contradictory uses of the categories make political if not descriptive sense as people placed each other in situations of everyday life."[39] In a similar manner, some recent work has emphasized how gender and caste differentiation formed part of the same process, while others have explored more fully the colonial state's role in the construction of a racial discourse that trumped previous markers of difference (including those of religion, culture, and origin).[40] All these approaches are helping to move the field beyond debates over how reliable colonial categories of difference were in describing early Latin American society, instead placing greater emphasis on the social construction of these group categories.

In a postmodern academic world—one in which the Enlightenment's essentialist notion of an autonomous human subject has been replaced with a view that emphasizes the construction of identity—it is not altogether surprising that historians have taken a renewed interest in the agency of the subaltern and their ability to recast colonial normative racial ascriptions. But this is not to argue that systems of categorization were trivial and unrelated to the lives of the individuals they purported to describe. Indeed, even casual observers of Latin American history are struck by the pervasive and long-term use of vocabularies of social and cultural difference. Throughout the colonial era legal and social structures buttressed formal terms of difference, giving these categories practical meanings and material consequences. Studies of social identities, therefore, must also take into account the factors (be they social, cultural,

economic, political) that provided categories of social difference a force and solidity, reproduced the terms over time, and influenced the behavior of historical actors.[41]

Considering these factors together, we are faced with the old social-scientific problem of relating agency to structure and understanding their dynamic relationship in time. A constructionist interpretation of personhood may place too much stock in the ability of individuals and groups to shape their identities, but the necessary response requires more than a simple reminder of the constraints on human creativity. Rather, to borrow from Eric Wolf's recent critique of anthropology, it involves paying greater attention "to how . . . [historical actors] mobilize, shape, and reshape cultural repertoires and are shaped by them in turn; how . . . [they] shape and reshape their self-images to elicit participation and commitment and are themselves shaped by these representations; how . . . [they] mobilize and deploy resources but do not do this 'just as they please,' either in the course of mobilization or in the wake of the effects they so create."[42] As the critique relates to colonial Latin America, scholars have become increasingly aware of how the production and contestation of social categories took place within a broader context of unequal power, particularly as embodied and expressed through colonial institutions.[43] Perhaps the richest body of scholarship has debunked the presumed total destruction of pre-Hispanic social structure and culture following the conquest and identified the responses of many indigenous people to the demands of a new colonial order.[44] The study of colonial Latin America's black population has confronted similar issues, examining the significance of racial designations and cultural change over significant spans of time.[45]

In sum, then, recent historical scholarship has underlined the degree to which imperial subjects played a hand in shaping the meaning of colonial racial discourse. Due to the nature of the available sources, such investigations must rely overwhelmingly on the political and public dimensions of identity. Keeping in mind that these texts often emerge from a context of unequal power, even repression and violence, this remains a dialogue rather than a soliloquy. Royal and Church officials may have been responsible for articulating and enforcing the norms of colonial behavior and thought, but they never governed passive human objects. Rather, colonial mandates, rulings, and legislation worked in conjunction

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with the actual exercise and negotiation of power between individual officials and a bewildering array of social actors. The identities of imperial subjects evolved not just in a macro sense, that is, as they changed across large swaths of territory and blocs of time, but in countless brief interactions, through the constant interplay between *internalized* understandings of self and group association and *externalized* social norms and categories. But how might one approach the study of this complex, pliant and seemingly elusive concept?

The Identity Nexus: Social Categories and Self-Understandings

The essays collected here support this more nuanced view of colonial practice and its relationship to social identities. As the book's contributors demonstrate, the lived experience of social categories rarely fits comfortably within normative models, and most individuals' life experiences could not easily be subsumed under a single identity—be it an ethnic, gender, or racial one. The hybridity so often noted by contemporary observers may have its own modern-day flavors and influences, but it was always a critical element of Latin American society and culture.[46] Thus, if we define social hybridity as a creative fusion of categories and self-understandings that were previously thought to be distinct, it is clearly not a product of the recent past but was present to varying degrees throughout the colonial period. But while such dynamics are recognized by historians and supported by empirical research, they have not been well integrated into a methodology for the study of identity.

The study of identity formation in colonial Latin America thus presents a methodological challenge, but also an exciting opportunity. On the one hand, the historical distance between our contemporary selves and the social actors we study limits the kinds of questions that we can ask of the past. Most importantly, the passage of experience through a fragmented historical record, and one that is primarily textual, mediates our access to the thoughts and emotions—the very subjectivity—of colonial subjects.[47] On the other hand, because social hybridity and mestizaje were so prominent in Latin America's colonial experience and drew so much commentary from contemporaries, commentary that was both mundane and learned, Latin America's colonial past provides an ideal historical laboratory to study identification. Moreover, with the ability to examine large blocks of experience and time, historians are well equipped

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to study topics that tend to change at a very measured and subtle rate, such as social identification. Taken together the two sides of this methodological coin—our limited and textually mediated knowledge of the past, but a past that is unusually verbose on the subject of identity—force historians of colonial Latin America to approach social identities with a healthy dose of caution. In practice, this means that historians often confront interpretive roadblocks and are expected to tease meaning out of incomplete documents or to reconstruct the past from sources that address one's analytic interests only tangentially. While such methodological issues are dilemmas for historians of all time periods—those studying the ancient, the modern, and everything in between—we suggest that a more explicit engagement with recent identity theory might make them a bit less painful for colonial historians.

As we have noted, one of the theoretical points of consensus in recent work on social difference is that identity is the result of a process that should not, and indeed cannot, be analyzed solely in terms of its constituent ethnic, racial, or gendered parts. Beginning most clearly with the writings of the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth, theorists of social identity began to shift their attention away from the ostensible "substance" of race and ethnicity and toward the processes that gave meaning to racial and ethnic categories, examining how social groups and identifications come into and out of existence. For Barth, the cultural "content" that supposedly defined ethnic groups—things like language use, style of dress, ritual practices, and so on—are in fact the product of boundary definition between social groups, rather than the root causes of group differentiation. Instead of some kind of deep, cultural *Urstoff* that was thought to differentiate one ethnic group from another, Barth argued that ethnic identities come into being through a process of group interaction and boundary definition. Boundary definition determines the importance of cultural contents as markers of social difference. As ethnic boundaries are defined, according to Barth, certain traits are emphasized as markers of group difference, while others are set to the side. By offering a theory to explain ethnic formation, rather than a descriptive anthropology of preexisting ethnic groups, Barth's work pointed out the possibility and in fact the probability of ethnic fluidity—the meaning of ethnic identities and even the existence of the groups they purport to represent should be expected to change over time.[48]

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Other theorists of identity have extended and critiqued the work of Barth in important ways, providing new insights into the processual ontology of identity. The relationship of individuals to collective identities has been an especially important line of inquiry. The sociologist Richard Jenkins emphasizes the inseparability of the individual and the collective in the process of identification. Following Barth, Jenkins notes that if the collective does not exist outside the process of boundary definition, then the student of identity must pay close attention to the choices and behaviors of the embodied individuals engaged in boundary definition, the social actors building and mending the fences of social difference. Jenkins's work suggests, in turn, that social identities arise from the feedback between individual behavior and the meanings derived from that behavior.[49]

But if social identities—both those of collectives and individuals—do not exist outside the actions and behaviors of embodied subjects, how are we to explain the emergence of collective identities out of a diverse group of individuals? Put simply, how do collectivities cohere? What is the social glue that creates a sense of groupness, a sense of "us" versus "them"? The anthropologist Anthony Cohen's early work addressed these problems by analyzing the substance of group boundaries, which he found to be essentially symbolic. Markers of group difference, Cohen pointed out, are effective because individuals routinely impute different meanings to them, enabling a sense of "groupness" without "sameness," that is to say, a collectivity with real meaning for its members despite difference and inequality within the group. Symbols mark community boundaries so well, Cohen suggested, because they are polyvalent and allow each member of a community to interpret them in different ways. Markers of group difference do not project a singular message of exclusion and inclusion but are in fact receptive to the many meanings that individuals choose to attach to them. Cohen's insights help to explain how communities that are internally heterogeneous and socially stratified tend to cohere around key symbols of collective identity during times of "external" social stress. The difference between the "internal" and "external" construction of community has also been the subject of important work by colonial and nineteenth-century historians of Latin America and reminds us to avoid facile ascriptions of group identity to the diverse historical actors that we are studying. Collectively, such work demonstrates that community solidarity was often fleeting and contingent, and rarely timeless or predictable.[50]

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The work of Barth, especially, has come under some criticism for overemphasizing how difference and boundary definition foster group identity. Critiques in this vein have pointed out different ways of group making, where the shared experiences and practices of the collective are the primary engine of solidarity. In such cases, actions that are "internal" to the collective are of utmost importance. Vered Amit characterizes these as "relational" or "network" identities. "These are forms of community," Amit continues, "which are conceptualized first and foremost by reference to what is held in common by members rather than in terms of oppositional categories between insiders and outsiders . . . What matters most, therefore, is what 'we' have shared, not the boundary dividing 'us' from 'them.' "[51]

Even in these critiques, however, it is clear that sociological and anthropological study of ethnicity and identity has undergone a fundamental shift. The *process* of identity formation is now placed at the center of the research agenda.[52] This reorientation of the field also provides historians a useful starting point for investigating social identities. First, analytic attention is now focused squarely on the actions and understandings of individual historical actors—rather than ethnic groups, caste categories, or other collective identifications that one encounters in the records of the colonial Americas. Analyzing the motivations and behaviors of living and breathing historical actors helps one resist the temptations of analytic "groupism" or "the tendency to treat groups as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be imputed."[53] Similarly, it reminds one to pay close attention to the power and limits of individual agency. To what degree are individuals constrained by the social identities they encounter in the world? How are those identities reshaped by actions of individuals?

Second, students of social difference—implicitly in some cases, explicitly in the work of Cohen and others—now pay more attention to the meaning of social identities. At about the time that Barth's work began to influence American anthropologists, this analytic shift toward meaning took place explicitly and much more prominently in the work of Clifford Geertz, symbolic anthropology in general, and eventually in the "cultural turn" among historians. As Geertz famously proclaimed, the study of culture is "not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."[54] As the Geertzian agenda became the main-

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stream, the individual moved to the center of our understanding of culture, as the agent responsible for interpreting culture and infusing it with meaning. Cohen offers, "We have to come to see culture as the outcome and product of social interaction, or, to put it another way, to see people as active in the creation of culture, rather than passive in receiving it."[55]

In sum, the study of social identities has evolved in three fundamental ways: it now focuses on the process of identity formation; it pays special attention to how the individual shapes identifications; and it examines closely the relationship of external categorization to individual self-understanding. These methodological changes hold important implications for historians of identity. They suggest, above all, that historians must reject the analytic groupism referred to above. Racial categories, caste labels, and other social identifications that pepper the archives of colonial Latin America cannot be studied as disembodied historical actors. Despite the apparent resilience and permanence of such categories, identification takes place at the moment when an individual interacts on a cognitive level with some external, publicly available system of social categories and symbols.[56]

Despite these theoretical advances, the very distinct meanings of identity (categorization and self-understanding) are not always acknowledged by researchers, who sometimes use the term to mean the former, sometimes the latter, sometimes both, and sometimes other things entirely.[57] Coupled with an explosion in "identity studies" in recent years, the slippery use of identity as an analytic concept has led to critiques that question the use of the term altogether. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper offer the gloomiest assessment, detailing the term's many and sometimes contradictory meanings. Because identity is so multivalent, they argue, and does not clearly distinguish between the processes of categorization and self-understanding, the term should be jettisoned in favor of a more precise nomenclature.[58]

While we agree that it is essential to recognize the differences between external and internal forms of identification, and a more exact vocabulary might help some studies from wandering down the path of analytic fuzziness, we are hesitant to discard the term "identity" altogether. Breaking the subject of identity into a number of apparently more precise labels is at times critical, as Brubaker and Cooper point out, but at others not only stylistically awkward but analytically misleading. As the empirically

grounded case studies in this book demonstrate, the creation of social identities always involves *both* categorization and self-understanding, *both* crafting and interpreting, *both* processes that are external and internal to the historical actors involved in them. We suggest that identity is in fact the nexus of categorization and self-understanding, and it is their very simultaneity that must be confronted by historians.[59] That is, identity comprises the relationship between the categories one is born into or placed into, such as Spaniard, Indian, mulatto, Otomí, slave, master craftsman, or tribute payer, and the lived reality of those categories: their meaning for an individual, the sense of groupness they may or may not create, the possibilities and limits they create for human agency, and so on. Researchers thus need a term such as identity that embraces the simultaneity at the heart of social difference, a term that captures the categorization (external to the individual or group or other unit of analysis) and lived experience (internal to the individual or group). The concept of identity reminds us to keep categorization and self-understanding in a holistic analysis, which is an essential methodological premise, since the two processes overlap and constitute one another, in both historical experience and the documents that recorded it. Placing identity at the center of the research agenda does not mean sidelining the analytic categories of gender, ethnicity, race, or class. Far from it, by structuring studies around the metaconcept of identity, we insist on the interrelatedness of these categories, a fact which has been noted in so many case studies of identity formation.

Now let us consider the application of these ideas to the colonial experience, and their implications for historical method. As we have noted, the study of identity is itself a hybrid endeavor at the level of analysis. On the one hand, the topic considers practices of categorization, things like census taking, proto-ethnography, legal codes, and other activities that imagined, identified, and distinguished colonial subjects. Collectively, we might call these social distillers, since they simplified human diversity into supposed elementary particles, into perceived or imagined essential characteristics.[60] All social distilling was carried out by historical actors who were themselves situated in a context of social relations and identifications, and we should be careful not to reify these techniques or disentangle them from the individuals who executed them. Practices of social distilling focus on an "external" world; they are public attempts to describe and order other human beings; they organize a social

reality that is thought to exist "out there" in the "real world." As social constructivists have amply pointed out, of course, such practices help bring into existence the very reality that they purport to describe. The historical study of identity must take as a starting point social distilling practices, often linked to institutions of governance, which describe and craft the external social world.

But categorization represents only half of the equation. Identity also embraces self-understanding, that is, the affective meaning of social categories, the sense of groupness as experienced by an individual, the lived reality of sameness or difference. Despite the real-world consequences of external categorization on human relations, the discursive description of groups does not necessarily lead to the *creation* of actual groups or collective identities.[61] The experience of group membership, which by definition must always be mediated through an embodied self, is thus another side of identity, one that in contrast to the external elements of categorization considers the internal construction of difference. Here again, Brubaker and Cooper offer a compelling criticism of identity, pointing out how recent scholarship often concludes that "identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple."[62] Case study by additional case study, such insistence on the social construction of identity, they argue, drains the term of its meaning. "If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere."[63] This is a trenchant critique, since it unmasks a trend in recent scholarship to ascribe unwarranted agency to historical actors, thus overestimating their ability to create or modify social identities.

But identity, we offer, is a term and a concept that is best understood through practices, and this methodological premise provides a natural check on the proliferation of agency (and identities) referred to by Brubaker and Cooper. One of the most salutary developments from scholarship falling under the general rubric of "practice theory" is a renewed attention to the mutually constitutive relationship of structure and agency.[64] Summarizing the work of Anthony Giddens and others, William Sewell describes this "duality of structure" as the way that "historical agents' thoughts, motives, and intentions are constituted by the cultures and social institutions into which they are born, [and] how these cultures and institutions are reproduced by the structurally shaped and constrained actions of those agents, but also how, in certain circumstances, the agents can (or are forced to) improvise or innovate in structurally shaped ways

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that significantly reconfigure the very structures that constituted them."[65] For Sewell, a more robust theory of "duality" must take into account the way that mental structures ("schema") are materially practiced (forming "resources"). Resources, in other words, are embodied performances of schemas that form a sort of cultural text, from which mental structures/schema are "read" and reproduced by historical actors.[66] Following from these insights, a fruitful method for analyzing the two sides of identity, we submit, is to focus on the interactions of colonial subjects around institutions at the moment when social categories are articulated, publicized, internalized, contested, and sometimes altered. Such an approach must examine not only the discourse surrounding these events—the "talk" of categorization and self-understanding—but also the contests over resources that usually accompanied such interaction. We might call these contact points, since colonial institutions created a space where ideas of social difference, of otherness and sameness, of us-them were realized and became tangible.[67] This method constitutes a new institutional history of sorts, revisiting the records of colonial institutions to examine the public meanings of social difference.[68]

Of course, contact point is only a metaphor for thinking about social interaction and a conceptual tool for gaining analytical purchase on the messiness of a distant past. By invoking this physical and temporal image we do not mean to imply the existence of distinct social identities prior to the moment of "contact," before the social interaction under investigation. To the contrary, it is the emergent meaning of social categories and identities that are the analytical quarry of this method. The goal is to focus on the processual nature of identity formation.[69] Bringing these moments and spaces into analytic focus helps to capture the lived experience of social categories and their historical contingency, without suggesting an unfettered agency on the part of subjects to negotiate or contest social categories. By placing the moment of institutional interaction and practice under scrutiny, the study of contact points highlights the social norms and rules, or, to use Sewell's terminology, the schema and resources that govern (and limit) agency. But because extant records of institutional interaction tend to record moments of extraordinary practice, they also reveal moments of creativity and agency, when individuals activated latent cultural schema, at once reproducing and potentially modifying the meaning of identities.[70] The case studies gathered here

employ this analytic approach to varying degrees and attempt to integrate the different facets of identity into a holistic analysis. Collectively, these studies demonstrate a sophisticated and practical understanding of culture and its relationship to identity. Culture is no longer seen as an all-encompassing category, from which an individual's sense of self is derived.[71] Instead, by probing identity formation in contact points, these studies view culture as a tool kit that allows individuals to interpret the social world and act within it.[72] One potential benefit of the topic of identity, then, is that it offers a way to think about the relationships of colonial subjects in a way that moves beyond the well-worn paradigm of domination and resistance.

Identities Examined

Having discussed the theoretical challenges and rewards the study of identity offers to students of early Latin America, we now conclude by previewing the volume's case studies, paying special attention to the ways that its contributors engage the concept of identity through the lens of colonial institutions. Although our authors cover a wide expanse of territory and span the length of the colonial era and even beyond, they share a common goal of exploring how imperial subjects fashioned various identities given underlying constraints, and how that fashioning helped shape in turn the "new worlds" they inhabited. Of course, the historical actors that constitute the subjects of the following nine chapters did not enjoy equal access to power and resources. Indeed, some occupied positions of little standing within their local community and exercised even less sway vis-à-vis the highest echelons of the imperial bureaucracy. Yet, taken together, their accumulative actions all contributed to an evolving and enduring imperial discourse on the meaning of difference. To repeat one of our initial points, then, the private and public aspects of identity are always deeply intertwined and inherently political, all the more so in a colonial environment buttressed by a presumed human gradient of relative inferiority and superiority. In such a setting, identity—that ascribed onto others and that embraced by oneself—could never be divorced entirely from issues of power for both imperial authorities and their subjects.

In the first chapter, Jeremy Mumford reconstructs the so-called Perpetuity Controversy in sixteenth-century Peru, a conflict that underscored the uncertain relationship between the Crown, indigenous (Wanka) lords,

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and their Spanish counterparts in the early colonial period. Spaniards recognized that indigenous lords possessed ancestral rights to aristocratic status that predated even Inca rule, yet many Spaniards hesitated to equate these "natural lords" of Peru with Old World aristocrats given their concurrent racial status as "Indians." Indeed, Mumford argues that these very assertions compelled some Spaniards to articulate in a much more explicit way what had been previously inchoate understandings of racial difference. Andean nobles, though, pushed for just such a conclusion by fostering a new hybrid identity that combined characteristics of both Spanish and Andean lordship. Ironically, kurakas protected their noble status much more successfully than the early conquistador elite, despite the kurakas' nominal position as vanquished, indigenous subjects. In essence, native lords, like the Spanish newcomers, benefited from the opportunities to reinvent oneself that the early New World offered to those daring and ambitious enough to seize them.

Turning to market relationships, Jane E. Mangan traces in chapter 2 the evolution of colonial racial hierarchies and categories that developed during the second half of the sixteenth century for the indigenous and mestiza women who dominated the urban trade of the great silver city of Potosí. As this introduction has demonstrated for imperial subjects more generally, these women were not passive objects who received their status and place in colonial society by benefit of Spanish fiat. Demarcated as much by gender, social class, and generational cohort, officials and other subjects tried to describe the countless indigenous women who plied their wares in the open-aired markets and stores of the burgeoning city. The author's careful reconstruction of these terms (for example, *indias gateras, regatonas*) highlights how indigenous and mestiza women subverted colonial assumptions of their gendered and racial deficiencies through their successful and assertive participation in the colonial economy.

David Tavárez also highlights the ambiguities of colonial racial terminology. Whereas Mangan's chapter shows how daily practice in the marketplace helped to generate new identities for an increasingly complex social environment, Tavárez reveals how even common racial categories like indio and mestizo failed to capture the complexities of plebeian experience for both colonial institutions and their subjects. Tavárez adapts the approach of the microhistorian to reconstruct the lives of three racially ambiguous individuals in seventeenth-century New Spain. Other-

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wise typical of the viceroyalty's mobile and culturally hybrid population, the three individuals eventually crossed paths with the Mexican Inquisition as a result of the bigamy and idolatry charges leveled against them. The Holy Office, often considered the most emblematic of the early-modern era's repressive institutions, was keenly interested in establishing the ethnic identities of the accused, since Indians had been removed from its jurisdiction in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Yet inquisitors found it difficult to establish firm legal identities for individuals whose kinship and social networks belied easy definition. In all three cases the inquisitors came to accept the prisoners' claims to indigenous status despite the legal ramifications and the doubts they continued to harbor. While on the surface the outcomes may appear to be clear evidence of the colonial subalterns' ability to renegotiate or "pass" into a more favorable racial category as their interests and circumstances dictated, Tavárez cautions the reader from drawing such a hasty and facile conclusion. For one matter, such judgments are relatively rare in the historical record, but more importantly the highlighted cases demonstrate the extent to which both the prisoners and the inquisitors fell hostage to the bureaucratic logic of the institution itself.

Thus far, our chapters concern primarily institutions and imperial subjects in or near the core zones of colonial power. In contrast, Cynthia Radding's chapter on the borderland societies of northwestern New Spain and the lowland Charcas zone of the South American interior highlights the ways in which collective identities and histories could both change and persist over the *long durée* in areas removed from the imperial heartland. Although living in dissimilar regions in terms of ecology and cultural development, the inhabitants of both borderlands faced similar pressures emanating from a constellation of colonial arrangements and institutions dominated by the Spanish presidio complex, the Jesuit mission, forced labor regimes, migration, and commercial mining. As they did elsewhere, indigenous people responded through creative and adaptive forms of resistance and accommodation. The histories of Charcas and northwestern New Spain remind us once again of the fluidity of what Tavárez calls the "colonial lexicon of difference." As each society remained in flux due to migration, demographic collapse, and other disruptions of colonial rule, so did the meaning (and even the composition) of the ethnic categories that coalesced to describe the regions' inhabitants.

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Mariana Dantas's chapter shifts our attention to the use of colonial racial categories in eighteenth-century Brazil. Focusing on the enslaved and free inhabitants of African origin and descent in the mining district of Minas Gerais, Dantas describes a regional economy heavily reliant upon black labor. Although they constituted the lowest echelons of local society, blacks enjoyed a modicum of mobility and agency as evidenced, for instance, in comparatively high manumission rates. Nevertheless, such conditions cannot belie the extent to which the legacy of slavery continued to cast a large shadow over the lives of the free-born and freed. Colonial institutions and prevailing social attitudes considered black individuals of poor esteem due to their base "quality" (*qualidade*), an essence informed by their lowly racial origins and connection to slavery. Tax policies and census reports, for instance, typically lumped free blacks and slaves into one category, while many Portuguese settlers considered them inappropriate spouses for their children. Still, Dantas demonstrates that the enslaved and free were not simply the passive receptacles of prevailing mores. As individuals and in groups, blacks carved their own spaces in colonial society, and in the process reworked and even transcended the racial categories imposed upon them. Significantly, one of the cumulative effects of rallying for their rights was the embracing of the racial labels used by religious sodalities. These became a core element of the members' personal identity as honorable, Christian vassals—in other words, black imperial subjects.

The possibility of black social mobility generated similar tensions in Spanish America, which Ann Twinam explores through the efforts of late-colonial blacks (*pardos* and *mulatos*) to secure a white identity from the king and his Council and Cámara of the Indies. Although the cases are numerically small, they offer a valuable glimpse into how royal bureaucrats, colonial elites, and at least some blacks understood the nature of whiteness and blackness. Once again we are confronted with the inadequacies of modern concepts and terms, such as "race" and "ethnicity." Paying careful attention to language and its subtle shifts over time, Twinam shows that the colonial discourse over whiteness drew from two principal sources: Iberian tradition and American innovation. In the end, race continued to hinge on intangible qualities tied to descent that only roughly mapped out onto modern conceptions of phenotype. Remarkably, all sides understood that a black subject *could* become white. Instead, they

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debated whether such a process *should* be allowed to occur. As Twinam points out in her concluding remarks, the legacy of this political impasse lingered long after colonial rule ended as the denizens of the new republics struggled to define the nature and limits of citizenship.

Whereas late-eighteenth-century imperial policy fueled antagonisms between Creoles and both peninsulares and castas in places like Caracas, Venezuela, Sergio Serulnikov's essay on the political landscape of La Plata (today Sucre, Bolivia) captures a moment where frictions with the metropole actually helped to bridge the gap between Creole patricians and nonwhite plebeians. How did this seemingly unlikely outcome come to pass? The principal grievances concerned the abolishment of the city's militias, the imposition of a royal garrison of "foreign" Spanish troops, and the impunity with which these outsiders preyed on the city's citizens. As Serulnikov shows, all the city's inhabitants shared these grievances, not just its leading citizens. That the city's diverse population, and its militia, had united to defeat a siege of tens of thousands of indigenous peasants during the maelstrom of the Túpac Amaru rebellion just a few years earlier only served to foster the growing sentiment that La Plata itself was a besieged colonial city set apart from a nefarious Indian and Spanish "other." Although class and ethnic divisions did not disappear, two riots in the 1780s compelled the city's Creole-dominated municipal council to support the unruly behavior of the urban plebeians against the king's own troops. He does not state this explicitly, but Serulnikov seems to share Twinam's debt to Brubaker and Cooper's concept of "situated subjectivity," although the situations the two authors describe are remarkably different in outcome. While the Venezuelan Creole elite mobilized to protect their own group's interest in opposition to unpopular royal policy and socially mobile blacks, the patricians of La Plata mobilized in support of the town's nonwhite populace, each group brought together by a common antagonism with the Crown and the peasantry. Although the outcome was essentially more inclusive in Bolivia than in Venezuela, the legacy of the growing antagonism between Hispanic urban dwellers and an indigenous hinterland endured all the same in the Andes for decades (indeed, centuries) after the end of colonial rule.

María Elena Díaz's chapter also analyzes the ways that imperial subjects fashioned "social identities" through a dialogue with the state and Church, a conversation channeled through their adaptation of the Iberian munici-

pality and town council. The author excavates the striking history of the royal slaves of El Cobre, a community situated along the imperial frontier of eastern Cuba. Originally the laborers of a privately contracted copper mine, the slaves of El Cobre became property of the Crown in the 1670s and almost immediately began seeking ways to shape the meaning of this unusual status to their best advantage. Most critically, the slaves of the king secured pueblo status and some degree of self-governance in return for their obedience (and tacit promise not to flee bondage through any other means besides future manumission). The ensuing dialogue between the slaves and a range of sympathetic and hostile officials illustrates quite provocatively the multivalent nature of identity formation. In setting up her study of this process Díaz rightly argues that historians must move beyond familiar conceptualizations (such as race or caste) to explore how the individuals they study employed a much more expansive "repertoire of social categories and identifications available to old regime imperial subjects." Such a "total" approach to identity formation recognizes that an individual or group's identity constitutes a range of nodal points in which understandings of race, for instance, are informed and inflected by considerations of class and place of birth, among other factors. Similar to earlier chapters on free and enslaved blacks, the chapter emphasizes aspects of the *cobreros*' hybrid identity that elided their presumed lack of agency as slaves. In their petitions and recorded collective memory, the community placed great stock in their inside, "native" position within colonial society. They presented El Cobre as a Creole (rather than African) community of loyal vassals whose labor and military service profited and protected the imperial enterprise. It is perhaps not surprising that community members often mentioned parallels with Indian pueblos, institutions also defined by their locally controlled town councils and state labor drafts. Indeed, these similarities and the inhabitants' own efforts to emphasize their native-born identities eventually merged into a foundational myth that linked a community of free blacks to an indigenous collective identity that preceded Spanish rule on the island.

Karen Caplan's chapter concludes our case studies with an examination of how indigenous communities and the state governments of Oaxaca and Yucatán retained, modified, and challenged three centuries of colonial institutions and political culture in the decades immediately following Mexican independence. Drawing on Tristan Platt's notion of a

"pact of reciprocity"—in which indigenous groups agreed to offer tribute, labor, and deference to the colonial state in return for a degree of local autonomy, particularly as it related to land—Caplan argues that indigenous groups in both states retained traditional expectations of state obligations and community responsibilities. Yet, by the mid-century mark, local political culture was also deeply informed by each state's experimentation with political liberalism and its championing of the universal rights of citizenship (and its own notion of municipal autonomy). In effect, indigenous groups expected that the governors and legislatures based in distant state capitals would continue to respect the "special" relationship they had long enjoyed with the Spanish Crown, particularly as it related to tax collection and local governing councils, while they simultaneously clamored for the same rights afforded to virtually all (read: male) citizens of the republic. But, as Caplan shows, the abolishment of juridically inscribed racial hierarchies hardly ended their political influence or simplified the complicated matter of governability at the local level. Overall, key demographic and economic differences between the two states meant that the ruling elite of Oaxaca were more apt to accept the modifications their state's indigenous groups brought to the liberal tradition than their counterparts in Yucatán. The inhabitants of both states, however, had to wrestle with the thorny question of what it meant to be a citizen and the extent to which that decidedly modern and presumably universal political identity included the myriad categories and self-understandings inherited from the colonial past.

No single answer emerged in Mexico, and even less so across all of Latin America. Indeed, the matter of identity, and how it maps over political, social, and economic inequality, remains one of the prominent "legacies" of the colonial era that continues to fascinate and preoccupy scholars of the region. The need to grapple with the concept and historical practices of identity, including all their theoretical and conceptual challenges, will likely remain with us for quite sometime. Thus, rather than an endpoint or culmination of what has come before, we envision this volume as a methodological inflection, deeply indebted to previous scholarship but offering a new approach to the study of the interactions that occurred among imperial subjects within the arena of colonial institutions. The essays in this collection demonstrate some of the fruits of this method, but they also suggest its potential for generating new ques-

tions and directions for future research. A tightly bounded inquiry on institutional contact points, for instance, might lend itself to the still-incipient effort to study colonial Latin America within the broader Atlantic world. Or, conversely, it offers the possibility of tracing the continuities (or discontinuities) of political independence through the changing praxis of Latin American subjects/citizens whose lives straddled these two eras. We also suggest that colonial identities might be productively traced as they rippled away from institutional contact points and into society. But whatever directions future studies take, it is our hope that this volume contributes to a collective enterprise that seeks to understand the constrained creativity exercised by imperial subjects when they interpreted, reproduced, and refashioned their worlds.

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ßI ch ϱ γ' Ł+3γ E(γ"!Ь-'!*8 +γ'\ ./+'γ7 <γu $$8<9γ *Patterns of Race in the Americas.*

ßL ch © ĩ+'$<*'"!9γDŏ)'γ> !<*$-&*8 !γ 5γO' /+') (9LγYR`z RYnγ<''γ +# γW +84 $γ !(γ© ++'$đ <g'8E9γ *Race, Nation, Class.*

15. ?g'JE9γ *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest,* @RU z RF:γ a $γ)8#γ ¼J8g8rZ'γ 5γ© ++'$<*'"Eh<γ //$ &Ë9γ !(γË8#γ'Á $*γ* γ<"*- *'γ)8<γ7 $Iγ68<Ú^Ú6"<γ/$'68 -#γ <¼Ë ŢŁ<Ë8/γ Eγè *8!γC . '$"& h<γ ++'0'(γ('//'E('!&3γ<''γ?*'$!9γDa'-(+8<. 9γ > /8* +"<. 9γ æ (γgË'γ© J+(Ú?3<*' .γ8!γ*)'γO'$</'&*86'γ 5γè *8!γC . '$8& γ !(γ*)'γ> $844' E:Lγ BQ ¤a $γ !'γ. **'$9γ('</"*'γ γ<) $'(γ'. /) <8<γ !γ8!)'$8*'(9γ k\'(9γ !(γD!˘*-$ +Lγ("Á'$đ 'E¼'<γ 5γ('<&'!*9γ +8./"'G γ('γ< E0$'γ5ª&-#'(γ.-&)γ. $'γ !γ$'+808 -#γ&$"*'$" γK #< &8đ 'g'(γO gHγ*Ë'γ6 $8 -<γ8./-$"*8'<γ*Ë *γ& !('.!'(γ8!k('+<9γ)'$'*"&<9γ !(γ5Ī+#'γ& !6'$*<γ* γ 'g'JE +γ(ï ! *" E¥γ*Ë !γ(γ. <*γ6 $8 E*<γ 5γ. ('$!Ú(3γ$ &8<*γ*) -0)*γK !*"Ú?'."*8#.γ <'. 8E0γ**as** !γ 4 ű -<γ'\&'/*8 E¥:γ

17. ţ'3γ<*-(8'<γ 5γ)34$8("*3γ8E&+Z('γx $&Ì γÅ !&+8!89γ *Hybrid Cultures* !(γ *Consumers and Citizens;* òË 4Ë 9γ *The Location of Culture.* a $γ7 $Iγ !γ*)'γ$'&'!*γ#-$0'γ"!γ'*)!8&γ$"0)*#γ æ Ő γ8('Eg8ƑJ γ. 6'.'Ė*<γ8!γ*Ë'γ$'08 E9γ<''γO <*'$ γ E(γ Ţ . <&9γ'(<:9γ *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America;* è !0'Jγ E(γ Q-ċ G9γ'(<:9γ *Contemporary Indigenous*

Movements in Latin America; O ++ $'#cγ*From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*; u "0N 0"!#cγ *Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion*; u +'cγ D e '#γ Q -+*"&-+*-$ +"#. γ Q'! &'ĄLγ ©)"+'γ4 *)γ0+ 4 +"G *" !γ !(γ& !*'. / $ $3γ'*)!"&γ$"0)*#γ. 6'. '!*#γ) 6'γ($ 7 !γ#"0!"5N "& !*γ **'!*" !γ"!γM *"!γC. '$"& cγ !(γ*)'γ i&-#γ 5γ*)'γ$'0" !ł#γ#&) + $#cγ-!*"+γ$'&'!*+3γ #*-("'#γ 5γ& + !" +γ M *"!γC. '$"& !γ"(' !*"*"'#γ) 6'γ) (γ γ('&"(' (+3γ o $*)γC. '$"& !γ /$ 6'! !&'γ! γ(-4*γ 7"!0γ* γ*)'γ"!ǁ+-'!&'γ 5γ ÿ ą?qγ / +"*"& +γ ('6'+ /. '!*#γ !γ*) *γ & -!*$3ł#γ)"#* $"& +γ/$ |'##" !qγa $γ|-$*)'$γ("#&-##" !γ 5γ*)'γ)"#* $"& +γ& !*'*γ*) *γ+'(γ* *)'γ0$ A)γ 5γ"(' !*"*3γ #γ !γ & (' ."&γk'+(γ 5γ#*-(3cγ#''γx+' # !cγDV(' !*" ũ"!0γV(' !*"ē3ĵLγ @R:γ l !γ*)'#'γ0'!' + 0"'#cγ#''γ © ('cγ *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*, Uz@]ɲγQ $#'cγ DS)lγQŁ+ɪ"ɔlůnjlγoſM ɪ"ŭγC.'ů"p ŭγV('!ɪ"ʰHcγ&:γŶ]`dķp:Ŷ]ɸdđłĕγŶz`:γ @]:γ © ('cγ*Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*, YFzY]:γ `d:γS) *γ'#γ! *γ* γ# 3γ*) *γ*)'γ'('γ 5γ$ &'γ"#γ! *γ Ċ# γ#''!γ <γ)"#* $"& Ċ+3γ E(γ&-+*-$ ++3γ& !Ψ #*$-&*'(:γV!('''(cγ4'& -#'γ"*γ"#cγ# .'γ#&) + $#γ& !*"!-'γ* γ$'+3γ !γ"*γ i $γ*)''$γ ! Ċ3#"#γ 5γ*)'γ & + !" +γ / <*:γ © 'γ 7 -+(γ $0-'cγ) 7'6'$cγ*) *γ"*#γ. $'γ$'&'!*γ. !"5'#* *" !#γ& Eγ#*"++γ 4#&-$'γ*)"#γ& !#*$-&*" !"#*γ"!*'$/$'* *" !qγQ $' 6'$cγ-!+"I'γ -$γ/$'5'$$'(γ*'$. γ 5γ&) "&'γ ¡"('!*"*3¥cγ$ &'γ"#γ+'##γ && . . (*"!0γ* γ*)'$γ(". '!#" !#γ 5γ <&$"/*" !γ¡':0:cγ0'!('$cγ&+ <#γ / #"*" !cγ'*&:¥:γS)'γ i $. -+ *" !γ 5γ Ɒ# &" Ċ$ &'Lγ1#''γ4'+ 7¥γ7 Ôγ !'γ **'. /*γ* γ (($'##γ*)"#γ #) $*& ."!0cγ Ċ*) -0)γ"*γ$'. ſ !#γ γ# .'7) *γ&+-.#3γ i $. -+ *" !:γ `@:γS)'#'γ5ª$.#γ 5γ# &" +"G *" !γ"!&+-('γ*)"!0#γ+"I'γ#-./*- $3γ! $.#cγ* ʒ '#γ 5γ0$''*"!0cγ !(γ$"*- +"G'(γ('5'$'!&'cγ7)"&)γW -$("'-γ) #γ& +T''(γ*)'γD $4"*$ $3γ& !*'!*γ 5γ*)'γ&-+Ņ *-$'Lγ !(γ"#γ#* $'(γ+"I'γ.'. $"'#γ"!γ¡ !(γ !¥γ)-. !γ4 ("'#:γW -$("'-cγ*Outline of a Theory of Practice*,]Õ:γ ``:γW $*)cγV!*$ (-&*" !γ* γ*Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. l !γ*)'γ*'$.γD! (+γ/ "!*#cł̃ĕγ#''γ M &+ -γ !(γQ -Á'cγ*Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. a $γ !γ'\ ./+'γ 5γ"*#γ //+"& *" !cγ #'γ*)'γ'## 3γ43γ eÌ Gγ"!γ*)"#γ6 +-.':γ `Y:γ l !'γ 5γ*)'γ-!"!*'!('(γ& !#'r-'!&'#γ 5γ"!"*" +γ'Á $*#γ* γ5ª&-#γ0$' *'$γ **'!*" !γ !γ *)'γ)"#* $3γ 5γ! !Úm-$ /' !γ/' /+'γ !(γ7 .'!γ7 #γ* γ 4#&-$'γ*)'γ|-!( .'!* Ċγ/ "!*γ *) *γ"('(' #γ 5γ$ &'γ'!& ./ ##'(γ +γ0$ -/#cγ-#*γ #γ*)'γ& !&'/*γ |γ0'!('$γ"! i $.'(γ"(' #γ 5γ4 *)γ. #&-T"!"*3γ !(γ5'."!"!"ē3γ `Õ:γ©''"!#*'"!cγDW-(((3cγ> !γħ -γ?/ $'γ γO $ ("0.ĄLγÕU`:γC(."**'(+3cγ©''"!#*'"!γ$'5'$#γ #/'&" T+3γ* γ) 7γ*)'γ#*-(3γ 5γ$ &'γ) #γ#)"Î'(γ"!γW$ P"+" !γ#*-("'#cγ4-*γ 0 "!γ7'γ7 -+(γ #-00'#*γ*) *γ*)'γ/ "!*γ"#γ. ('γ'6'!γ. $'γ/ 7'$|-+γ43γ (/*"!0γ*)'γ*'$.γ*identity* 7)'!γ"*γ & !&'$!#γ"!("6"(- +γ !(γ0$ -/γ i $. *" !γ¡$ *)'$γ*) !cγ# 3cγ Ł &" +γ$ &" +γ("#& -$#'¥:γ `É:γ y !γ ħ -!0cγDS)'γ o'7γ>-+*-$ +γ u"#* $3γ> .'#γ* γ l +(γQ'\"& ɕLγ``R:γ?''γ +# γ y !γ ħ -!0cγDS)'γ>- -*+ γM G $-#:Lγ `U:γ?-00'#*"6'γ#* *'.'!*#γ$'0 $("!0γ' $+3γ! *"6'γ6"'7#γ 5γ©'#*'$!'$#γ"!&+-('γM &I) $*cγ De -4+'γQ"#* I'!γV('!*"3Lɲγ>+'!("!!'!cγD Ĵa"'$&'γ !(γÿ!! *-$ +γ>$-'+*3ɛ̃Lɲγ !(γ© (cγ *Transcending Conquest*, '#/'&" T+3γ&) /:γ `qγ?''γ +# γ6 $" -#γ'## 3#γ"!&+-('(γ"!γ?&) 7 $*Gcγ '(:cγ*Implicit Understandings*; C!($"'!γ !(γC($! cγ*Transatlantic Encounters*. `F:γS)'γ& !&'/*γ"#γ. #*γ& . . !+3γ ## &" *'(γ7"*)γ*)'γ)"#* $" !γQ 0!-#γ Qϱ$!'$cγ +*) -0)cγ"!γ5Γ&*cγ)'γ($ 7#γ*)"#γ"('γ ³ .γ γ#*-(3γ*) *γ/$'( *'#γ)"#γ 7Eɲγ#'γQϱ$!'$cγ *Race Mixture in the History of Latin America*, ÉÕɲγQϱ$!'$cγDS،'γuÛ#* $3γ`γ^ &'γ^'T *" !#γ

Race Mixture in the History of Latin America,

La población negra de México,

To Love, Honor, and Obey in Colonial Mexico; *Indios detrás de la muralla*; *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba.*

Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico,

Santiago de Guatemala,

Race, Caste, and Status.

Race and Class in Colonial Oaxaca,

The Limits of Racial Domination.

Race and Class in Colonial Oaxaca,

Blacks in Colonial Veracruz.

Calidad,"

40. *Mestizaje"*; *Hall of Mirrors*; *Modern Inquisitions.*

Women Who Lead Evil Lives; *Hall of Mirrors*; *Moon, Sun and Witches*; *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule*; *The Nahuas after the Conquest*; *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest*; *Huarochirí*; *Maya Society under Colonial Rule*; *Rural Society in Colonial Morelos.* *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes*; *Indigenous Migration and Social Change*; *Andean Journeys.* *Wandering Peoples* *Landscapes of Power and Identity*; *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North*; *The New Latin American Mission History.* *The Negro Family in the United States,*

´ &A¿Bγâ1!! !41B .,γ*Slave and Citizen*, T×}ď u $#I 6"%Gγ2 (γ γ4 2(γ&)1$0 γ 0 "!#%γ%)"#γ# ď &1ΤΤA;γ Í 3Ă)γ 5γ%) γ! 0$ γ/ #%,γ# I"!0γ% γ"(!%" ũγ&B2%B$12γD#B$6"6 2#Lγ"!γ2"6"!0γ/ /B2 ă *8=!<γ*H1*γ& B2(γ4 γ%$ & (γ4 &Iγ% γC5$"& !γ%$1("% !#,γ !γ1//$ 1&)γ%) %γ"!#/"$ (γ#%B(!%#γ =|γè1*8!γC Í $"& ,γ . #%γ5ž . B#23γ¬ !G12 γC0B"$$ γW 2%$v!ũγ u $#I 6"%G,γ*The Myth of the Negro Past* 1!;γ*The New World Negro*; u $#I 6"%Gγ1!(γ u $#I 6"%G,γ*Rebel Destiny*; C0Z"$$ γ òA!*Jt'!,γ*La población negra de México* 1!(γ*Cuijla*. C!γ12% $! %"6 γ . (2γA.˷$0 (γ43γ%) γ úģàè<,γ Í1; γ"!γ1γ#B&&"!&%γ3 %γ#B00 #%"6 γ ## 3γ43γ?"(! 3γQ"!%Gγ1!(γ^"&H $(γO$"& ,γ%)1%γ IJH8ΤAγ ∫ "&1!γ%$1"%#γ& !γ4 γ("#& $! (γ"!γ∫$"&1!γC . $"&1!γ&B2%B$,γ%) γ \/ $" !& γ 5γ AE<Τ1®A Í A!*γ1!(γ%) γQ"((2 γO1##10 γ$ rB"$ (γ1γç!(. !% 2γ$ #%$B&%B$"!0γ 5γ%) γB!($ă ΤI EÂγ Í 1%$8B,γ Ę. "ô)γ2 (γ^ γ γ Ĭ"$23γ$1/"(γ(6 2 / . !%γ őγ1γ("#%"!&%γ Ų>$ 2 Lγ&B2%B$ ũγ ó8!*§γ1!;γO$8& ,γ*The Birth of African-American Culture*. Q $ γ$ & !%23γ#%"22,γ γ3 B!0 $γ ÂAEAJ1*8 !γ 5γ)"#% $"1!#,γ Î !γ"!ÞB !& (γ43γÊ)!γS) $!% !ß#γ7 $I,γ) #γ/ #"% (γ%H %γ γ <8Â!8é&1!%γ; 0$ γ 5γ$ % !%" !γ 5γC5$"& !γ&B2%B$ γ("(γ &&B$γ 6 $γ#/ &"k&γ/ $" (#γ 5γ%H γ &=Τ=!81ΤγA$1γ¡1!(γ4 3 !(¥ũγâ) $!% !,γ*Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World*. ?B/ $" $γ#%B(" #γ7"%)"!γ%)"#γ6 "!γ 5γ$ # 1$&)γ# Iγ% γ(. !#%$1% γ1γ& $$ 21%" !γ »A¢ AA!γJA& $(;γ4) 6" $γ !(γ4 2" 5#γ 7"%)"!γ& $% "!γ %)!"&γ#216 γ0$ B/#γ1!(γ%) γ &=JJA<¾=!;"!0γ#B/ /23γ1$ 1γ 5γC5$"&1,γ1#γ$ & $((γ"!γ$ & $(#γ 5γ%)1%γ%". :γ? ,γ i $γ \1. ď ¾ΤA,γ¢IJAA*,γ*Recreating Africa*. mrB 223γ". / $%1!%,γ$ & !%γ#%B(" #γ(. !#%$ % γ) 7γ0$ B/γ ;8<*8!&*8 !#γ&H1!0 (γ1#γ%) γ421&Iγ/ /B2 %" !γ"%# 25γ 6 26 (:γu $.1!γW !! %%,γ i $γ"!ă <*1E&A,γΤ8! I<γ1γ<H"Îγ"!γ%) γ". / $% !& γ 5γC5$"& !γ !(γo 7γ© $2(γ"(!%"%" #γ% γ%) γ; 0$A γ =|γJ1&8 ĩγX8*ZJ ,γ/) ! %3/ ,γ !;γ2 012γ#%1*B#γ"!γ%) γ i $. 1%" !γ 5γ& . .B!"*3γ4 B!;1$" #γ ţ Jγ *HAγ ®8&A$ 312%3i#γ "!&$ 1#"!023γ >$ 2 γ/ /B21*" !ũγ W !! %%,γ DM 6 $#,γ a1."23γ1!(γ ý õAE;<¦Ð γ¢ γ1Τ< γH8#γ*Africans in Colonial Mexico*.

46. u =EÂγX1!3γ %) $#,γ%) γ7 $Iγ 5γ%) γa$!&)γ %)!)"#% $"1!γ? $0 γ¬$BG"!#I"γ/$ ď ;;A<γé! γ \1Í /2 <:γ l 5γ/$"!&"/12γ"X / $%Íγ*The Conquest of Mexico*; *Images at War*; *L'Aigle et la sibylle*; *The Mestizo Mind*.

47. ¢HAJ ȳγl$%!A$γ)1#γ$ & !%23γ& 22 (γi $γ1!%)$ / 2 0"#%#γ% γ/ 3γX $ γ1%% !%" !γ% γ%) γ &=!<*JG&*" !γ 5γ#B4ê &%"6"*3γ"!γ%) "$γ7 $Iˉγa $γl$%! $,γ#B4ê &%"6"%3γ $γD%) γ !# .42 γ 5γ Ę` ;A<γ=5γ/AJ&A/%" !,γ1Ĉ &%,γ%) B0)%,γ(A#"$,γ5 $,γ !(γ# γi$%)γ%H %γ !". % γ1&%"!0γ <G»8A&*<Ð γ/J 6"; #γ%) γI 3γ% γB!; $#%1!("!0γ%) γ $"0"!#γ 5γ"!("6"(B 2γ10 !&3,γ 6 !γ1#γ *HAfγAş8#*γ7"*H8!γ1γ< &" 2γ#%$B&%B$ γ%)1%γ/1$%" 223γ(% $."! #γ%) "$γ1&%" !#:γD?B4ê &%"6"*3γ æ;γÅG˜T*ZJ12γÅJ8*"rB ,LγS×ld

48. ¢AAγA</ &"1ΤΤ3γ)"#√!*$;B&%8 !:γa $γ. $γ$ &!%γ7 $I,γ# γW $%),γDW B!($" #γ1!(γ Å=EEA&*8=!<,Ðγ1!;γDm!;B$"!0γ !(γmX $0"!0γV##B #γ"!γ*) γC!123#"#γ 5γm%)!"&"%3:Lγ

49. AEz !<,γ*Social Identity*, 1!;γ*Foundations of Sociology*, &) /:γT}ď Ûè°γÅ=HA!,γ*The Symbolic Construction of Community*. a $γ$ 2 61!%γ#%B(" #γ 5γM1%"!γC . $"ă &1Eγ&=X XZ!"*"A#,γ#A ,γ1X !0γ *HA$#,γ y1!γ ħ B!0,γD> !Ⅱ2"&%γ1!(γ? 2"(1$"*3γ"!γV!("1!γ Ž8ΤΤ1ÂAγM8|ALüγQ122 !,γ*Peasant and Nation*, A#/ &"1223γ&˷ 1/ˉγSlď a $$"##,γ*Maya Society under Colonial Rule*.

Ûú°γ ơ 8*,γJ !γCE*)$ / Τ=03γ7"%H B*γ> . XB!"*3Ą,ìγÉ]zUd:γ

Û⌊°γ AEz !<,γ*Social Identity*, FÉzFU:γ

Û¯°γò Nj»1IA$,γM ®AX1!,γ1!;γ¢*1X1* ®,γDm%H!"&"*3γ1#γ> 0!"% !:Lγ

WT‰ ¬ $%G,γ*The Interpretation of Cultures*, W0‰

WW0‰>) !,γ*Self-Consciousness*, ´]:γ

NU:γ l !γ%) γ& 0!"%"6 γ . ("1%" !γ 5γ %)!"&"%3,γ# γW$B41I $,γM 6 .1!γ1!(γ?%1.1% 6,γ Dm%)!"&"%3γ1#γ> 0!"% !:Lγ

NF:γW$B41I $γ1!(γ> / $,γDW 3 !(γĴV(!%"%3,ß Lγ@R:γ

NR:γW$B41I $γ1!(γ> / $,γDW 3 !(γ¿V(!%"%3:ß Lγ? γ12# γW !(2 ,γDS) γ>$"#"#γ 5γĴV(!%"%3ßγ "!γu"0)γQ ($!"%3:Lγ

N]:γW$B41I $γ1!(γ> / $γ%) .# 26 #γ0 #%B$ γ% γ%) γ("Ł&B2%3γ 5γ# /1$1%"!0γ%) γ#%$1!(#γ 5γ "(!%"%3γ7) !γ%) 3γ$ 5 $γD#"%B1% (γ#B4ê &%"6"%3,Lγ $γD ! ß#γ# !# γ 5γ7) γ ! γ"#,γ 5γ ! ß#γ # &Ł12γ2 &1%Ł !,γ1!(γ) 7γ¡0Ł6 !γ%) γé$#%γē7 ¥γ ! γ"#γ/$ /1$ (γ% γ1&%:LγúW 3 !(γŗV(!%"*3ß Λγ @F:γ V!γ("Ĉ $!%γ6 !B #,γ !I"!#γ1!(γ>) !γ Í1I γ& Í / 22"!0γ1$0B. !%#γ i $γ/21&"!0γ "!("6"(B12γ1!(γ& 22 &%"6 γ"(!%"%" #γ"!γ%) γ#1. γ1!123%"&γé 2(:γ? γ !I"!#,γ*Social Identity*, #/ &"1T23γ&)1/:γY9γ1!(γ>) !,γ*Self-Consciousness*.

Ud:γý $γ1γ("#&B##" !γ 5γ/$1&%"& #γ%)1%γ.1¸ γ)B.1!#γD2 0"42 Lγ% γ0 6 $!. !%#,γ# γ?& %%,γ *Seeing Like a State*.

Uū:γM 6 Í1!,γDV#γĴÇ1& ßγm## !%" å ĄLγR]`ŋγW$B4 ɛ $γ1!(γ> / $,γDW 3 !(γĴ¸( !%"%3ß Lγ`Fŋγ C đ"%,γ"An CE%)$ /2 03γ7"%) B%γ> .ÍB!"%3ĄLγ@]z`d:γ

U`:γW$B4 ɛ $γ1!(γ> / $,γDW 3 !(γĴV(!%"%3ß Lγ**1.**

UY:γV4"(:γ

UÕ:γS)"#γ"#γ1γ21$0 γ4 (3γ 5γ#&) 21$#)"/,γ1!(γ ! γ7"%) B%γ&2 1$23γ(é! (γ4 B!(1$" #,γ4B%γ ! %142 γ7 $I#γ"!&2B(γW B$(" B,γ*Outline of a Theory of Practice* 1!(γ*The Logic of Practice*; ¬"((!#,γ *Central Problems in Social Theory* 1!(γ *The Constitution of Society*; ?7"(2 $,γ D>B2%B$ γ"!γC&%" !LĹγ? 7 22,γDCγâ) $3γ 5γ?%$B&%B$:Lγý $γ1!γ 2($γ$ 6" 7γ 5%) γé 2(,γ# γ l$%! $,γDS) _3γ"!γC!%)$ /2 ' γ#"!& γ%) γ?"\%" #:Lγý $γ Í $γ$ & !%γ"!% Ÿ !%" !#,γ# γ 1Í !0γ %) $#γW" $!1&I",γ*The Fabrication of Labor*, 1!(γ%) γ ##13#γ& 22 &% (γ"!γ?&)1%GI",γ > %"!1,γ1!(γ?16"0!3,γ (#:,γ*The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*.

UÉ:γ? 7 22,γ§ ù γS) $3γ 5γ?%$B&%B$,LγW0‰

UU:γV4"(:,γ@Yqγ

UF:γW3γi &B#"!0γ !γ#/ &"é&,γ"!#%"%B%" !1T"G (γ !& B!% $#γ4 %7 !γ& 2 !"12γ#B4ê &%#,γ B$γ! ij %" !γ 5γ& !%1&%γ/ "!%#γ("Ĉ $#γ³ .γQ1$3γM B"# γO$1*%&#γ7 22ĦIE 7!γD& !%1&%γG ! #Lγ. %1ij /) $,γ7)"&)γ#) γB# #γ% γ$ 5 $γ% γ%) γ&B2%B$1Tγ³ !%" $#γ 5γ%) γ& 2 !"åγ7 $2(,γ7) $ γD#B4ê &%#γ /$ 6Ł B#23γ# /1$1% (γ43γ0 0$1/)"&γ1!(γ)"#% $"&12γ("#éB!&%B$ #γô! 7γ Í %Ň,γ1!(γ7) #γ %$1ê &% $" #γ! 7γ"!% $# &%:ßγ*Imperial Eyes*, F:γW %)γ 5γ%) #γ% $Í#,γ) 7 6 $,γ1$ γ1*% Í/%#γ% γ &1/%B$ γ%) γ#B4ê &%"6Ł%" #γ1!(γ"(!%"%" #γ%)1%γ1J γ/$ (B& (γ"!γ& 2 !"12γ !& B!% $#:γ

UR:γS)"#γ"#γ1γ% &)!"rB γ ./2 3 (γ43γ%) γ1!%)$ /2 0"#%γV$! γ?"26 $421%%,γ7) # γ$ & !%γ 7 $Iγ \/2 $ #γ%) γ%"0)%γ2"!I10 γ4 %7 !γ& 2 !"12γ"!#%"%B%" !#γ∨!(γD$1& γ%)"!I"!0qLγm\1. ij "!"!0γ%) γ& !%1&%γ/ "!%γ 5γ%) γO $B6"1!γV!rB"#"%" !,γ?"26 $41%%γ(. !#%$1% #γ) 7γ& 2 ij !"12γ"(!%"%" #γ7 $ γ%) γ/$ (B&%γ 5γ#B4ê &%#γ"!% $1&%"!0γ7"%)γ&1% 0 $" #γ 5γ# &"12γ("Ĉ $ij !& ,γ&1% 0 $" #γ7) # γ41&I4 ! #γ7 $ γ%) γ"!#%"%B%" !#γ1!(γ4B$ 1B&$1%"&γ/$1&%"& #γ 5γ %) γ& 2 !"12γ#%1% :γ?B&)γ"!% $1&%" !γi$. (γ%) γD&B2%B$12γ("12 &%"&γ 5γ& 2 !"12"#. :Lγ ʤ*od*ij *ern Inquisitions*, `@]qγV!γ1γ("Ĉ $!%γ"!#%"%B%" !12γ# %%"!0,γ# γ%) γ"!! 61%"6 γ#%B(3γ !γ³ ij & 2 $ (γ."2%"1#γ"!γo 7γ?/1"!γ43γy"!# !,γ*Bearing Arms for His Majesty*.

69. š Eγ*H"<γ/ "!%,γ< γÊ !I"!<,γ*Social Identities*, FN G FU:γ

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JEREMY MUMFORD

Aristocracy on the Auction Block

Race, Lords, and the Perpetuity Controversy of Sixteenth-Century Peru

Early in 1565, Don Antonio de Ribera rode into the valley of Jauja with a group of Spanish horsemen to confront the valley's indigenous lords. One of those lords, Don Felipe Guacrapaucar, had recently visited the royal court in Castile as a noble vassal of the king and had returned with a coat of arms and other signs of the king's favor. Ribera himself had made a similar visit to court not long before. The honorific "don" which the two men shared, an aristocratic marker jealously guarded within Hispanic society, seemed to place them in the same class.[1] However, on instructions from the colony's governor, Don Antonio confiscated Don Felipe's and the other lords' Spanish weapons and horses, implements of power which were also marks of noble identity within the Spanish idiom. Henceforth, as "Indians," they would no longer have the right to own or use them.[2]

This chapter examines the events that led to this confrontation in Jauja and those that followed it, an episode from the very beginning of race formation in Spanish Peru. In the 1530s, some four decades after Columbus's first landfall in the Caribbean, Spaniards invaded the Andes, overthrew the Inca empire, and established the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. They meant what they said when they called America a New World, new for both colonists and colonized: a Spaniard crossed the Atlantic precisely in order to become a new person, while indigenous people had no choice but to become different from whom they had been—they became "Indians." People of all backgrounds struggled to shape their own identities in this chaotic environment. But neither Spaniards nor Andeans knew just what the word "Indian" was going to mean.

Its meaning was important for both the landscape of identities and the institutions of power. Spanish officials exercised direct authority over Spanish colonists but governed indigenous Andeans through the already-existing power structure: the Andean lords whom they had found governing the provinces when they arrived. These lords—called *kurakakuna*, *kurakas*, or *caciques*, depending on the context—had ruled their people under the authority of the Inca kings, and expected to continue to do so under the authority of the Castilian king. For them, "Indian" was less significant than "lord" in defining who they were. The evolving relationship between these two kinds of identity would help shape colonial rule.[3]

Meanwhile, a class of Spaniards—the *encomenderos*—tried to define their own identities as lords in colonized Peru. In gratitude for their service to the king, especially military service during and after the conquest, the Crown had granted them *encomiendas* (trusts), a limited and temporary overlordship over specific Andean kurakas, which the encomenderos wanted to improve and extend.[4] They differed from the kurakas in background: most kurakas were born lords, but most of the early encomenderos came from far less exalted families within their own culture.[5] What raised them above the kurakas was the fact of conquest—one of the empirical realities that would, over time, make possible the imagined reality of "race."[6]

Two themes linking the chapters in this volume are race and identity. Both are familiar concepts, used and often misused by generations of historians to make sense of people and the past. Both are today the subject of epistemological debate, which is part of the motivation of this volume. Juxtaposing the identity of race with that of lordship shows how indeterminate both were at the dawn of the colonial era and brings to light the contingent series of events that helped define both.

Kurakas and encomenderos wanted the same thing: to rule the Andes on behalf of the Spanish king. To obtain what they wanted the two groups engaged in an extraordinary bidding war, known to historians as the *perpetuity controversy*, in which each tried to buy the status and privilege of aristocracy from the king.[7] He sent a commission to investigate the competing offers. But in the end he disappointed both sides. Instead of ruling through hereditary lords, whether Spanish or indigenous, the Crown created new officials whose power derived from appointed political office, not lordly status. It was in this context that the king's governor

banned kurakas from owning arms and horses, markers of nobility, and sent the encomendero Don Antonio de Ribera to disarm his indigenous counterparts. While repudiating both groups' aspirations, the Crown further stigmatized the kurakas as racially barred from the status of Spanish nobility.

Yet this was not the end of the story. While the Crown stripped encomenderos of virtually all aristocratic power, it could not marginalize the kurakas: it needed their cooperation to control their indigenous subjects. Ironically, the conquered kurakas fared better than the conquering encomenderos in retaining their identity as lords. In spite of everything, the kurakas succeeded in converting themselves into a hybrid aristocracy within the Spanish empire.

Encomenderos

The valley of Jauja, in central Peru, was home to the Wankas, one of the many different ethnic groups the Incas had ruled, whose labor and fertile lands made their kurakas and encomenderos rich. In the struggle between native and Spanish lords, Jauja produced a leader for each of the two camps: the encomendero Don Antonio de Ribera and the kuraka Don Gerónimo Guacrapaucar, Don Felipe's father. In the year 1554, the two men fought side by side against the enemies of their king. They fought to defeat a rebellion by certain encomenderos against royal attempts to limit the power of their class, the last of a series of civil wars which had roiled the viceroyalty since its founding. Other encomenderos, however, remained loyal to the king. Ribera was one of the loyalist captains, leading men on horse and foot against the rebel leader, Francisco Hernández Girón. As the wet summer gave way to fall and winter the two sides skirmished and maneuvered. The king's knights—for so they saw themselves, living out a medieval dream of glory at the ends of the earth—wore down the rebels month by month. At last a loyalist band including Guacrapaucar's Wanka fighters defeated Girón in Jauja.[8]

Don Antonio de Ribera had fought at the beginning but was not present for the victory. His fellow loyalist encomenderos had sent him as their representative to the Spanish court, to ask the king, ironically, for the same thing for which Girón had rebelled: more power for encomenderos.[9] They had originally had the right to Indian labor but were now limited (at least theoretically) to collecting tribute; the typical enco-

mienda, furthermore, was limited to two lifetimes, those of the original recipient and his heir. On behalf of his peers, Ribera asked for two things. First, for *perpetuity:* the right to pass their titles to their descendants indefinitely; and second, for *jurisdiction:* the authority to appoint judges over their Indian subjects, as Spanish lords did. These two rights, together, would make the encomenderos' office tantamount to aristocracy.[10]

Encomenderos argued that enlarging their powers would be good for the viceroyalty, by giving its natural leaders a stake in peace.[11] The current situation was a vicious cycle in which Spaniards rebelled against the king, then switched sides at the last minute to help the king defeat the rebellion, receiving new or larger encomiendas as a reward. With no standing army except the encomenderos themselves, the Crown could not break the cycle. Don Antonio de Ribera was well qualified to discuss Peru's troubles: he himself had sided with the rebels in an earlier civil war, before proclaiming his loyalty and taking up arms against the king's enemies.[12]

More important than Ribera's arguments, however, was the offer that accompanied them: to purchase perpetuity and jurisdiction from the king. There was nothing corrupt about the proposed transaction. In the social thought of the era, it reflected the complementary roles of subject and king: the subject offered a *servicio*, or service (possibly in the form of money), and the king gave a *merced*, a gift or reward. Ribera caught the king's attention with an extravagant offer. In exchange for perpetuity and jurisdiction, the encomenderos of Peru would collectively pay the Crown 7.6 million pesos—twice the national debt of the chronically cash-strapped monarchy.[13] The offer came at an opportune time. Charles V, who was both king of Spain (1516–55) and Holy Roman Emperor in Germany, was worn down by failed wars with France and other European rivals. He was preparing to abdicate the Spanish throne, passing it to his son Philip II (1555–98) under the shadow of bankruptcy.

Were the encomenderos' hopes realistic? It seems incongruous to imagine them as seigneurial lords over Andean vassals, since historians have emphasized the limitations on an authority which was only temporary and included no rights over Indians' land or labor.[14] The encomendero, however, was much more a lord than this description implies. It is not just that he could demand labor and land from his subjects illegally (although he often could). More significantly, the status of Castile's ter-

ritorial lords was close enough to his own to make the transition seem feasible.

Castilian lords, like colonial encomenderos, had little direct control over their subjects' lands and labor, compared to lords elsewhere in Europe. In underpopulated Castile, where true feudalism never evolved, land was less valuable to a lord than subjects were; he acquired the former as a means of getting the latter, going to great lengths to induce peasants to settle on his land. But once they were there he could neither force them to leave nor to stay against their will. Castilian peasants were subject to few of the demeaning forms of personal service common in other countries and lived in tight-knit, self-governing communities that controlled their lands in exchange for annual payments to the lord.[15] In their organization and autonomy they resembled Andean peasant communities, and Castilian lords' rent was structurally equivalent to encomenderos' tribute; the two forms of limited lordship were remarkably similar, although historians have downplayed the resemblance.[16] Besides collecting rent, Spanish lords' one form of authority was the right to judge crimes and disputes, which provided both fees and influence over their subjects; this was what the encomenderos sought in 1554.[17] Finally, with respect to encomiendas' early expiration date, encomenderos had an encouraging precedent. In the past, Castilian kings had granted most seigneurial titles for a single lifetime only, like encomiendas in the New World. But during the fifteenth century, they changed this system, rewarding their supporters with new titles that they could pass on to their descendants—what one historian has called "one of the most radical social revolutions of Castilian history."[18] In bargaining for perpetuity, the Peruvian encomenderos sought to recapitulate what the Castilian aristocracy had achieved not long before.

The institution of the New World encomienda seemed designed to encourage such hopes. Based on a Castilian feudal grant, it required the encomendero to serve the king in arms.[19] Frequent rebellions meant that encomenderos such as Ribera pulled on their chain mail regularly in the king's service (if not, as in the case of Girón and other rebels, against him). The life they led, along with the chivalric romances they read, confirmed their self-image as medieval knights.[20] To encourage settlement, the Crown had even offered to make common-born settlers *hidalgos*—minor nobles—and to raise those already noble up a rank.[21] The

medieval frontier of the *reconquista* had offered such opportunities; why should the new frontier promise anything less?

The 1550s, in fact, were an unusually propitious moment for the encomenderos' hopes at the Spanish court. Although Charles V saw his hopes in Europe dashed by military defeats, it seemed still possible to rescue the situation—to redeem lives and treasure already sacrificed—with new cash. Both the abdicating emperor and his son Philip wanted to keep fighting. Philip immediately placed the Peruvian proposal at the top of his agenda. Following debate among his advisors about the dangers of alienating so much power, Philip decided to sell the encomenderos half of what they wanted: perpetuity, but not legal jurisdiction. He appointed a commission to go to Peru to negotiate a sale on these terms. But he ordered them to proceed cautiously and keep all options open: he had heard that the kurakas were considering a counteroffer.[22]

Kurakas

In that same year, 1559—five years after Don Antonio de Ribera departed for Spain, and as the king was preparing to send commissioners to Peru—a group of kurakas met to formulate a response. The kurakas, representing seventeen encomiendas in the region of Lima, appointed two Spanish friars to represent them at the Spanish court, Bartolomé de las Casas and Domingo de Santo Tomás.[23] Speaking in the kurakas' name, the friars offered the king one hundred thousand pesos more than whatever the encomenderos might bid, and a minimum of two million pesos if the encomenderos could not muster a bid for what the king was prepared to sell (perpetuity without jurisdiction). In exchange, the king would not appoint new encomenderos when the current ones died off but (under his own overlordship) would restore "the old political order they had in the time of the Inca kings, because in this consists their entire conservation."[24]

Although the kurakas had served the Inca empire, as they did the Spanish, their authority was independent of it. The Andes were a patchwork of local ethnic groups with their own histories and customs, and most had lived under Inca rule for less than a century before the Spanish arrived. The Incas depended on the local lords for the same reason the Spanish did later: to control their subjects and deliver tribute and labor. With the Spanish conquest the kurakas exchanged one empire for another, and the difference, at least initially, may not have seemed very great to them.[25]

Each encomendero received tribute from one or more kurakas. As overlord, the encomendero depended on the kuraka for his power, but the kuraka did not depend on the encomendero for his own. The historian Karen Spalding called kurakas the "cutting edge" of colonialism, since their local knowledge and authority made Spanish rule possible. This cutting edge could be a double-edged sword for the conquerors: the kurakas' knowledge of both worlds could also help them thwart the Spanish.[26] Many colonists despised and feared the kurakas, but the viceroyalty could not function without them.[27]

The kurakas' identity was therefore enigmatic. They were subject to abuse from even low-ranking Spaniards. Yet colonists accepted them as the Andeans' "natural lords" (*señores naturales*)—in the words of a kurakas' petition in 1581, "like the dukes and counts and marquises in Spain." Militarily, politically, and economically, almost any encomendero was superior to almost any kuraka, yet kurakas had the greater right to be called "lords."[28]

If anyone understood the ambiguous position of the conquered kuraka, it was Don Felipe's father Don Gerónimo Guacrapaucar, lord of Luringuanca, a community neighboring Ribera's encomienda in the valley of Jauja. Don Gerónimo came to power before the Spanish conquest and died some time after 1565, in one lifetime witnessing a whole era of transformation.[29] But to understand what the Spanish conquest meant to Guacrapaucar, we have to go further back, to the Inca conquest of Jauja some seventy-five years before. Before the Incas came, the Wankas' world was a hard one. They lived in small chiefdoms perpetually at war; we can still see the remains of their walled towns, dense with small round houses high up on the mountain peaks. The Wankas lived in the peaks, a punishing climb from their fields in the thin air at 3800 meters, for protection; the chiefdoms were perpetually at war. Incas described the Wankas as savage warriors who stretched their enemies' skins for their battle drums.[30] From the bones in the graves beneath their houses, we know that their nutrition was poor, their lives short. Even their leaders were humble. Colonial Wankas said that their ancestors' chiefs were simply those fiercest in battle, to whom others looked for protection. Archaeology shows that elite households were a bit larger than others, with better tools, but not by much: the leaders did not live very differently from their subjects in that rough-hewn world.[31]

Inca conquest brought the Wankas both costs and rewards. It brought new labor demands and the burden of foreign rule, but also a peace which allowed them to move down from the peaks and spread out in the valleys.[32] The Incas retained some of the preexisting leaders as kurakas to rule on their behalf, as they did throughout their empire, while bringing the kurakas' sons home to educate in Cuzco, the Inca capital. They modified Wanka customs they disapproved of, for instance pressing them to substitute deer skulls for dog skulls as musical instruments.[33] Excavating elite Wanka households, archaeologists map a slow spread of Inca architecture and implements, evidence that kurakas were embracing Inca culture.[34]

The relationship between Inca kings and kurakas drew on an Andean discourse of reciprocity, unequal but complementary, between ruler and ruled. At the local level, when commoners labored on a kuraka's field, he reciprocated with a feast; its value was less than their labor, but its abundance and spectacle made up the difference. The Inca kings established a similar relationship, providing feasts and participatory rituals, an appearance of empire-sized "generosity," in exchange for their subjects' labor as mediated by the kurakas. In the formation of the Inca empire, the kurakas surrendered their preexisting authority to the king who then "generously" returned it to them, under Inca overlordship.[35] This resembled the encomenderos' relationship to the Castilian king. In their own eyes, the encomenderos had conquered Peru for their king (or reconquered it from rebels), surrendering to him the lordship they had won with their own strength; it was his part of the bargain to give it back to them in the form of an encomienda. The Castilian economy of servicio and merced resembled an Andean pattern, making it all the less surprising that the kurakas adapted so easily to Spanish rule.

The kurakas, after all, had a model for what it meant to be a conquered lord. Don Gerónimo's grandfather, perhaps, had made the transition: collective defeat, personal advancement, and the seductive embrace of a powerful outside culture. So it was natural for the grandson to expect a similar outcome from Spanish conquest. He gave up the name Apu Manco Guacrapaucar and was baptized Don Gerónimo. The lord of Lurinquanca sent his sons (including the young Don Felipe) to school with Spanish friars and raised them to serve their faraway Castilian king. He built a Christian church where he would one day be buried.[36]

A kuraka's most immediate relationship, though, was with his enco-

mendero, not his king. The historian Steve Stern described the alliances that grew up between encomenderos and kurakas as each learned how to benefit from the other. The contact point between Andean labor and Spanish capital and connections generated wealth; encomenderos and kurakas together controlled that point, and both had opportunities to get rich. Some kurakas established lucrative businesses, for instance growing coca and selling it in the mines of Potosí (as Jane E. Mangan discusses in her chapter). But as Stern pointed out, these alliances did not last indefinitely. Spanish demands steadily increased, while kurakas' ability to meet them declined.[37]

One difference between the Inca conquest and the Spanish one was that the Incas brought peace but the Spanish brought wars that never seemed to end. During his long reign, Don Gerónimo watched his people die around him: he had fifty to sixty thousand subjects when he came to power, but a census soon after his death showed only a third of that number.[38] Some died from Spanish diseases, some fled Spanish demands, and others perished in Spanish wars, both the encomendero rebellions and a slow-burning war against Inca princes who had taken refuge on the upper Amazonian forest refusing to submit to the Spanish.[39] These losses were the heavy price of Don Gerónimo's loyalty to Spain.

The Wankas had embraced the Spanish cause from the beginning. Don Gerónimo recalled that he was among the first to pay homage to Francisco Pizarro, giving the conqueror food, clothing, gold and silver, and Wanka men and women to serve him in future battles; over seven hundred of this group never came home. They were not the last. Every time the king's captains marched between the mountains and the coast they marched through Jauja and conscripted Wanka servants and fighters for their battles. The capture of the rebel Girón in Jauja was only the most recent. "In the encounter," Guacrapaucar reported laconically to the king, "some Indians died."[40] Having begun his career as an Inca and Wanka lord, Don Gerónimo might now be described as a Spanish and Wanka lord. And when a Spanish lord performed a servicio for his king, sacrificing lives and treasure, he expected a reciprocal merced. Should not Don Gerónimo receive honor from his king, rather than being sold into a perpetual encomienda?

This was the position of Peru's kurakas who gathered in Lima in 1559 (and in other regional assemblies throughout the country that soon fol-

lowed their example, with the support and advice of Spanish friars), calling the bluff of a colonial class that needed them to control the masses but was not willing to concede them aristocratic power. They claimed a political role, not as conquered subjects but as natural lords freely acknowledging an overarching emperor. And they offered to pay for it, with insouciant self-confidence: "They had learned that the King was . . . constrained by necessity, and many of them were rich and powerful, and they wanted to give some *servicio* of money in order to supply his necessity."[41]

But could the kurakas afford to pay the millions of pesos they offered? They had just endured two decades of avaricious encomenderos, war, and disease. Many Spaniards doubted the kurakas' promises—and, for that manner, the encomenderos' as well. Yet neither offer was entirely implausible. In the past, Peru had created extravagant fortunes for the luckiest encomenderos, and Pizarro's companions had won legendary wealth from the Incas' gold. Some said that far more Inca gold remained hidden in places known only to the kurakas. The king, in any case, was willing to hope that both sides could back up their promises. He sent the kurakas' representative fray Domingo de Santo Tomás to Peru with the commissioners, encouraging him to keep negotiating on the kurakas' behalf.[42]

In 1562 the friar traveled through the southern Andes with two Inca princes, convening a series of assemblies to canvas the kurakas' views. The kurakas of Jauja took an active role in these assemblies, in the Lima meeting of 1559 and in a larger one in the village of Mama in 1562. At that assembly over a third of the attendees (the largest single contingent) were under the authority of three Jauja kurakas. Don Gerónimo Guacrapaucar sent one of his sons, Don Carlos, to represent him.[43]

But he sent his son Don Felipe to plead his merits directly at the royal court in Spain. Like any Spanish lord, he submitted a record of his past servicios and asked for royal mercedes. The courtiers had likely never encountered anyone like Don Felipe—a kuraka's son educated by Franciscan friars, who had helped capture the last Spanish rebel in Peru—and he must have made an impression. From the autumn of 1563 to the following spring, accompanying the king on his travels from one Spanish city to another, Felipe received from him more than ten different grants and privileges. They included a royal pension, a prohibition against Spanish cattle ranching in Jauja, a coat of arms, and the title of paramount lord of Jauja. Young Don Felipe more than satisfied his father's hopes.[44]

The encomenderos' negotiations in Lima, meanwhile, had gone poorly. They wanted both perpetuity and jurisdiction, but the commissioners were only authorized to sell them perpetuity. And even if the commissioners could have given them everything they asked for, the encomenderos were now willing to pay far less than what Ribera had at first proposed.[45] Many doubted that either encomenderos or kurakas could afford to pay what they claimed.[46]

Frustrated at the lack of a deal, King Philip ordered the commissioners home; together with the viceroy they drafted their final report.[47] They had come to Peru determined to sell perpetuity to the encomenderos, but they now believed that only a few could afford it. They proposed a compromise: selling a third of the encomiendas to their encomenderos in perpetuity, selling a third to their kurakas under royal jurisdiction, and keeping a third to give to new candidates on a temporary basis, as before.[48] Whatever weight the commissioners' suggestions might have had, however, vanished when they were unexpectedly caught in a corrupt influence-peddling scheme.[49] The project of selling perpetuity to encomenderos, which had seemed to promise great things, had wound down to a discouraging stalemate.

The new governor whom Philip appointed, Lope de Castro, had scarcely taken office in 1565 when he received disturbing news: a secret plot to rebel had come to light among the Indians of Jauja. The planned uprising was to encompass the whole of the Andes, in concert with the unconquered Inca princes of the upper Amazon.[50] Royal officials uncovered a large hidden cache of Spanish-style pikes—seemingly damning evidence. Don Gerónimo and the other Wankas denied the plot, saying they had made the pikes for a planned Spanish expedition to the Chilean frontier. Castro dismissed this alibi, though he was all the more shocked by the plot since (as he reported to the king), "The Indians of this valley are those who have served your Majesty better than any others."[51]

Was the conspiracy real or imaginary? Historians have tended to believe that the Wankas were indeed turning against their ruthless European overlords.[52] But along with Spanish pikes, the Jauja kurakas had adopted relationships and commitments that made switching sides difficult. It is unlikely, for instance, that they would have allied with the Inca princes after years of fighting against them on the Spanish side; Don Felipe's new coat of arms, in fact, featured three severed Inca heads,

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representing his family's military service for the Crown. This service had included manufacturing pikes for the war against Girón,[53] and there is little reason to doubt that these new pikes were for the same purpose. The kurakas' service to the king was the basis for their ambitions: just like the encomenderos, they traded in the economy of servicio and *merced*, a natural extension of the Inca-era politics of reciprocity.

But the colony's embattled and insecure state, which might have made a shipment of pikes a welcome gift for Castro, made them all the more menacing in the circumstances in which they were found. Fixed in the ground and pointing up at an angle, pikes could stop charging horses, which were the Spaniards' most important military advantage over Andeans. Andean acculturation was beginning to reduce that advantage. And Jauja was a center of Spanish acculturation. Many Wankas learned artisanal trades in Spanish workshops, which made the mass production of pikes possible in the first place; it was the Indian servant of a Spanish carpenter who first reported the alleged plot.[54] Wanka Hispanicization had assisted the loyalist defeat of Girón, but now it seemed to threaten the colonial state.

This acculturation prompted Castro to ban native Andeans from riding horses or using Spanish arms—skills he knew many had learned all too well.[55] The image of a kuraka on horseback was a disturbing one for Spaniards.[56] Juan de Matienzo, an influential colonial official, expressed alarm that some Indians could ride and shoot better than many Spaniards, made excellent gunpowder, and even excelled in the *juego de cañas*, a polo-like Spanish game played on horseback. To reconcile this with the deficiencies he perceived in them, he asserted, "The Indians of the kingdom are so skillful (*hábiles*) that there is nothing they are taught which they do not learn very well, as long as it is not something which requires prudence. . . . If this [prudence] were not lacking, they would not be among those who Aristotle says were born slaves by nature (*de naturaleza siervos*)."[57]

Aristotle's statement in the *Politics* that some people are destined by nature to be slaves had recently come into fashion among some Spanish intellectuals. The medieval worldview had rationalized inequality on the basis of legal status (noble, commoner, slave), not race. But in the 1530s a well-known scholar in the Spanish court had invoked Aristotle's idea to explain what he saw as Native Americans' inherent inferiority, and it

became one strand of a nascent ideology of race.[58] In the context of Andean kurakas, the allusion was significant. No one denied that kurakas were natural lords, but if they were also natural slaves, their lordship must be of a peculiar, racialized kind. This was not the lordship for which the kurakas had attempted to bid.

Castro responded firmly to the apparent treason of the Wankas: ordering the arrest of Guacrapaucar's son Don Carlos, he deputized the encomenderos of Jauja to disarm their own subject kurakas. The encomendero Ribera, riding with thirty Spanish horsemen to take command of the valley from its native lords, might have reflected that he had won at last.[59]

Aristocracy Denied

If Ribera thought so, he was mistaken. Even while Governor Castro was sending encomenderos to crack down on kurakas, he was laying plans for a new class of royal officials who would finally end both sides' hopes of seigneurial rule. The Indians' thwarted rebellion served as justification for appointing new, unprecedentedly powerful rural governors, called *corregidores de indios*. A corregidor's jurisdiction was large, typically the territory of four or five encomiendas. The new officials promised a level of centralized royal control over the countryside well in advance of that exercised in Spain itself.[60]

Among the first corregidores Castro appointed in 1565 was Juan de Larréinaga, to rule the valley of Jauja. Larréinaga was inferior to Ribera in social background, connections, and wealth.[61] Castro may have selected him precisely because he thought he would be easy to control. Yet in appointing him corregidor, Castro gave him nominal powers that dwarfed either Ribera's or Guacrapaucar's. According to his instructions, he was to resettle native Andeans in centralized villages, police them closely, impose a new tax, and carry out a general census.[62] The new towns would govern themselves through Spanish municipal institutions, with indigenous *alcaldes* (judges or mayors) and *cabildos* (town councils), to be selected from the Andean commoners, not the kurakas. By creating a population of visible, governable Andean subjects and by delegating local authority to commoners, the new system would help the Crown to rule directly, rather than through lords.

In Jauja, the new corregidor began his work with vigor. Within weeks of his appointment, Larréinaga had chosen sites for a new town in each of

the valley's three encomiendas, to which the whole population would later be moved. Each site had streets laid out in a grid surrounding a plaza, church, whipping post (*picota*), and jail. In the town he founded for Don Gerónimo's people he himself marked out the plaza with a cord. He appointed alcaldes. The new forms of authority, it seemed, had already begun to extend royal control directly into the Andean countryside.[63]

Yet just six months later he was gone from his job, disconsolately seeking new opportunities in Lima. A Spanish priest appealed to Castro on his behalf: "For all that he has worked in this province and the great beginning he has given to what your Lordship assigned him, he should be compensated for a life which his unhappy fortune has made far from what it should be."[64]

While the precise nature of Larréinaga's unhappy fortune in unclear, his "great beginning" as corregidor was not all that it appeared: he failed to tame the power of the kurakas. In fact, instead of appointing a commoner as alcalde for Guacrapaucar's community, he appointed Guacrapaucar himself. This appointment overturned the purpose of the reform, but it was probably necessary for Larréinaga to establish himself at all. Even encomenderos such as Ribera, with greater personal resources and connections than Larréinaga had, did not try to deal with Andean peasants except through their kurakas. Although his son Don Carlos languished in prison on an accusation of rebellion, Don Gerónimo Guacrapaucar's power remained unchallenged.

Throughout the valley of Jauja, kurakas and their relatives became the alcaldes and cabildo members, treating the new offices not as threats but as vehicles for their own ambitions to Spanish-style lordship. This is not surprising; in Spain itself, nobles and oligarchies tended to control the once-popular institutions of municipal self-government. Members of one cabildo near Jauja appealed to the king to grant them "the privileges and preeminances which such officials [town councilors] have" in Castile, including holding their office in perpetuity and being ranked as gentlemen (*cavalleros*).[65]

Castro's attempt to neutralize the kurakas was his one major failure. In the long term, the rest of his reforms succeeded.[66] The corregidores took hold, Andeans moved to centralized towns (*reducciones*), and the encomenderos lost all hope of seigneurial power. Viceroys continued to distribute encomiendas, but they were little more than royal pensions. The

kurakas, too, failed to get what they hoped for. Far from becoming noble *cavalleros* (literally horsemen, knights), they remained prohibited from owning horses and swords, the symbols of Spanish lordship. But the kurakas remained the lords of their Andean subjects.

It was this that most distinguished Peru from other colonies. While this chapter has focused on Peru, similar struggles took place elsewhere. In New Spain, too, encomenderos pushed for perpetuity and Spanish governors flattered but resisted their hopes, ultimately establishing Spanish corregidores and indigenous cabildos. Throughout the Spanish colonies, Indian society remained largely autonomous, organized partly by indigenous norms and partly by Spanish municipal institutions, answering to royal officials who tapped it for tribute and labor. This separation underlay the idea of "two republics," one of Spaniards and one of Indians. While always more theoretical than real, the separation remained until the nineteenth century, when the founders of Latin American independence tried to abolish it in favor of a single universal citizenship. Their efforts succeeded only in part, as Karen Caplan's chapter in this volume shows. In some places the institutions of the "republic of Indians" survive and have even become stronger in the twenty-first century.[67]

But within this general picture, Peru stood out for the success of the native lords. Elsewhere, commoners serving in municipal cabildos became the primary agents of Indian self-government.[68] In Peru the kurakas continued to govern as lords. Royal officials tried to control them by appointing their successors as they died but found that without popular legitimacy kurakas had little effective power, so they preserved hereditary succession.[69] Kurakas kept their central position in Peruvian society until the late colonial period, when a period of upheaval a9d rebellion (discussed in Sergio Serulnikov's chapter) prompted a major reorganization of the "republic of Indians" in the Andes.[70]

The later history of Jauja illustrates the kurakas' persistence. Spanish governors targeted the Guacrapaucars in the years after the discovery of the pikes. In the 1570s, viceroy Don Francisco de Toledo publicly burned the Jauja kurakas' royal documents and privileges, probably including Don Felipe's coat of arms.[71] But Don Felipe had allies in the Church and the Lima high court, who protected him from Toledo's attempts to neutralize or banish him.[72] Shortly afterward, he was assisting the corregidor as an "educated Indian [*indio ladino*] who [had] been in Spain" and in

time became governor of the encomienda's Indians.[73] A man claiming descent from the family went to the Spanish court in the 1660s to ask the king to create an order of nobility for the kurakas.[74] Another descendant of a sixteenth-century Jauja kuraka, holding power in 1755, confronted Spanish attempts to take his people's land.[75] The kurakas survived as lords, controlling Andean subjects and mediating their contact with the Spanish world, yet at the same time limited by the racial restrictions that Castro, in the 1560s, helped create.

Conclusion

"Identity" is an ambiguous word. It combines as least three elements: that of being assigned to a category, that of being part of a group, and that of having a specific understanding of oneself.[76] "Race," for instance, is sometimes an external act of naming, sometimes a community of shared experience, sometimes an internal sense of self, and often a combination of these, but it is not necessarily any one of them in a given situation. The native-born people of the Americas had many identities—based on age, sex, ethnicity, property, status—but it was colonialism that stamped on them the label "Indian." This identity was never fixed or impermeable, and at first it was a mere name whose meaning remained undetermined.

Scholarship on Andean kurakas has treated their traditionalism as a matter of identity and their acculturation as a matter of opportunism.[77] But our common observation of status competition shows that in times of change, people attain or retain status by being alert to styles and values emanating from new centers of power and internalizing them. Responding to subtle cues, even unconsciously, we adopt new styles of dress, speech, and self-carriage, new likes and dislikes—to a degree, new identities. Lords (male and female) are typically traditionalists, claiming a status legitimized by antiquity. But within a changing power structure, lords can be flexible and creative in redefining their identities.

Sixteenth-century kurakas—at least some kurakas, in the region of the central Andes—reinvented themselves in hybrid terms. They retained some of the practices and mentalities of pre-Hispanic lordship, even in some cases leading secret non-Christian religious rites, but they also collaborated actively and creatively with the colonial regime.[78] Internalizing and manipulating the Spanish concept of *señor natural* (natural lord), they hoped to become the dukes and counts of Peru.[79]

In tracking their bid for advancement, this chapter has focused as much on institutions as on identities, because lords' and would-be lords' identities were bound up with the institutions of the evolving state. Historians once thought that early modern European monarchies were locked in struggle with an entrenched aristocracy, but most now agree that kings negotiated various, sometimes contradictory alliances with lords and other social groups, offering them a stake in state institutions.[80] Perry Anderson observed kings allying with the aristocracy against the commoners, while Helen Nader observed them allying with local towns against certain lords.[81] As the dominant figures in this multipolar politics, kings encouraged competing factions to bid for royal favor—as the encomenderos and kurakas did in the mid-sixteenth century.

Throughout the expanding Iberian empires, some local leaders tied their fortunes to those empires, inserting themselves into the competition for royal favor. Such leaders might or might not owe their position to the Christian king but certainly counted on him for future advancement. It was natural for them to adopt new styles of thought and self-presentation, even while retaining their own traditions. In sixteenth-century Morocco, the Berber leader Yahya-u-Ta'fuft forged a close military alliance with the Portuguese; he kept his own Muslim religion, but his letters to the king called on the vocabulary of Iberian noble honor, servicio, and merced. Portuguese nobles in the colony intensely resented his competition and repeatedly accused him of treachery. But the king refused to take sides, infuriating the Portuguese lords by inviting Yahya to court and consistently showing him favor and gratitude.[82]

The Berber's career resembled that of Andean nobles such as the Guacrapaucars. But while Yahya's Portuguese rivals could invoke his religion against him, Spaniards such as Ribera could not find any obvious leverage against indigenous nobles who expressed a fervent Christianity, had served the king with blood and silver, and seemed to be as innately capable as any Spaniard. Recall that the official Matienzo asserted that in spite of appearances, Andeans were radically deficient: they lacked "prudence." "If this were not lacking," he continued (as quoted above), "they would not be among those who Aristotle says were born slaves by nature."[83] The phrasing suggests a process of reasoning: Andeans, particularly kurakas, appear to be gifted, yet it cannot be that they are equal to Spaniards. What, then, are they missing? It is prudence, or good judg-

ment, a quality often defined as necessary for noble honor. It was, in part, kurakas' pretensions to Castilian lordship that spurred colonial Spaniards to articulate ideas of Indian race.[84]

Notes

1. *Spanish Peru, 1532–1560* (*señores de vasallos*), *Spanish Peru, 1532–1560* (*hidalgos*): *Gobernantes del Perú*, *El estado en el derecho indiano*, *Encomienda y encomenderos en el Perú*, *Lucas Martínez Vegazo*, *Spanish Peru, 1532–1560*, *Primera y segunda parte de la historia del Peru*, *Feudalismo, señorío, y nobleza en la Castilla medieval*, *Gobernantes del Perú, cartas y papeles, siglo xvi*, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú*, *The Changing Face of Empire*, *pesos ensayados de tributo*,

El estado en el derecho indiano, *El rostro de la comunidad.*
La encomienda indiana.
Nobleza y monarquía, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain,*
El régimen señorial en el siglo XVI,
The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350–1550,
Política indiana, *Books of the Brave;* *Amadises de América.*
Colección de documentos para la historia de la formación social de hispanoamérica, 1493–1810,
eds., Nueva colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España y sus Indias,
Las Obras escogidas de fray Bartolomé de las Casas,
Kuraka *cacique,* *kurakas,* *El cacique en el virreinato del Perú;* *Curacas, reciprocidad y riqueza;* *To Feed and Be Fed.*
Huarochirí,
Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru,
How Chiefs Come to Power, *Don Francisco de Toledo, supremo organizador del Perú,*
'Señor Natural'
Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru,
How Chiefs Come to Power.

The Economic Organization of the Inka State,

Curacas, reciprocidad y riqueza,

Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest,

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Relaciones geográficas de Indias,

44.

Nueva colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España y sus Indias,

Colección de documentos inéditos,

Gobernantes del Perú, cartas y papeles, siglo xvi,

Nueva colección,

Documentos históricos del Peru en las épocas del coloniaje despues de la conquista y de la independencia hasta la presente,

Gobernantes del Perú, cartas y papeles, siglo xvi,

The Vision of the Vanquished,

Documentos históricos,

Huarochirí,

Gobierno del Perú,

The Fall of Natural Man,

Gobernantes del Perú, cartas y papeles, siglo xvi,

El corregidor de indio en el Perú bajo los Austrias.

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JANE E. MANGAN

A Market of Identities

Women, Trade, and Ethnic Labels in Colonial Potosí

In 1550 Spaniard Pedro Cieza de León described the *gato* or main market plaza of Potosí: "In one part of it went a row of baskets of coca, that was the best wealth in these parts; in another, piles of shawls and luxurious shirts, thin and thick; in another part there were mountains of maize and of dried potatoes [*chuño*]."[1] Cieza de León also observed in great detail the city's people. Potosí, he commented, attracted "large groups of *yanaconas*" and "the most beautiful *indias* of Cuzco and all the kingdom."[2] As the abundance of silver turned Potosí into a boomtown, indigenous inhabitants were at the heart of the creation of urban colonial culture. Despite their common category devised by Spanish rulers, "Indians" were in no way a monolithic group. Cieza's observations about types of people reveal how Spaniards grappled with differentiation among Indians while holding onto a racialized notion of how Indian and Spaniard differed. But if Spaniards tried to figure out how to label Potosí's residents, so too did indigenous peoples. Preconquest identities and colonial developments converged to influence the social hierarchies in these cities. The Indian types Cieza observed are objects in his writing; yet in the history of the city they emerge as actors in the very market that captured his attention. Indeed, instead of purely passive constructions such as those Cieza de León offered, indigenous people's actions in the urban markets of colonial Peru shaped new ethnic identities.

This chapter uses labeling of women in early Potosí markets to explore the creation of colonial identities. The expansion of markets and trade in Potosí prompted extraordinary social differentiation for indigenous peoples. To be sure, the role of indigenous women in trade was larger than

that of indigenous men. In the space of a few decades, Cieza's indias from Cuzco claimed a distinct economic role: the sale of coca from Cuzco. Not only did officials, customers, and merchants recognize the women by the products they sold but they gained a reputation for their aggressive manner of trade, their profits, and their dress. The labels that identified women marketers reveal a Spanish need to categorize so as to control subjects both indigenous and female. Yet it would be shortsighted to consider these identities as solely colonial constructions. The labels serve as a window onto change in market women's activities.

The period between 1545 and the early 1600s saw subtle but important shifts in women's roles in Potosí's market and the identities shaped and reinforced therein. This chapter explores three such urban colonial identities that merged gender and urban trade with ethnicity. First is a discussion of the broad category of *indias gateras*, indigenous market women, with attention to subgroups like *pallas*, indigenous noblewomen. Next, the pernicious *regatones*, indigenous hucksters, serve to highlight how different types of marketing tactics emerged in response to given social and economic factors. Finally, the *mestizas en habito de india*, literally, mestiza women in Indian habit, reveal a sector of urban women whose Spanish bloodlines and indigenous lifestyle counter traditional thinking about trends toward Hispanicization. In each instance these female figures, non-Spanish all of them, played integral roles in the urban economy. These women came to represent a decidedly non-Spanish urban female type with economic know-how and strong will.[3] The tenacity of the characterization suggests that while indigenous women's aggressive economic activities led to business success, they clashed with expectations of appropriate female and indigenous roles. Thus emerged colonial market identities based on Indianness, gender, and economy. If markets were, as I argue elsewhere, an Indian domain, female vendors constructed an identity based on roles within urban trade and expressed this identity through customs, language, and dress.[4]

Indigenous market women are ubiquitous in the Andes even today, but this chapter treats the first historical period to give birth to the role of women in the market economy and the labels associated with that era. The opening section of the chapter deals with concepts of ethnicity in the sixteenth-century Andes. Next, the discussion moves from concepts to historical context with a discussion of Potosí's early history and emergence

of its markets. The heart of the chapter explores labels used frequently in the colonial era to indicate a female identity linked both to indigenous heritage and market activities. The female traders of Potosí serve as fodder to clarify how social and economic factors in the sixteenth-century Andes combined to link the ethnic identities of first indigenous and then mestiza woman with occupations in trade. As women's specialization in markets increased, their power as economic actors was palpable. Labels to differentiate among female traders helped merchants, officials, and customers understand the hierarchies of urban economy. These labels also helped to control specifically female economic activities. Ultimately the labels used to identify these women stand as evidence of a new ethnic identity among indigenous peoples—one rooted in the urban colonial experience.

Race and Ethnicity in a Changing Landscape

In colonial Spanish America, new identities were in the making as Spaniards, Indians, and Africans began to produce children and families in the 1500s. Constructions of identities changed as Spaniards acted to control the demographic realities of miscegenation that threatened basic tenets of colonial rule. People distinguished their kind from others through a variety of factors including skin color, physical features, place of origin, language, dress, religion, and occupation. As the Spanish extended their rule in the Americas, *race* as defined by skin color, physical features, parental identity, and lineage became increasingly important in defining one's place in society. Much of what historians use to discuss racial identity exists because Spanish officials, notaries, scribes, priests, and observers chose racial terms to identify people in official documents that we can read today. As we will see, however, these labels suggest not only Spanish efforts at control but also native Andeans' shifting circumstances.[5]

Spanish officials in colonial Peru attempted to organize people into groups of Spaniards, Indians, and Africans and to discourage social and sexual mixing of those populations. Spaniards used race to exercise control over economic issues. Tribute categories, for instance, had a racial basis. Moreover, acculturation to the dominant power in society, a process known now as Hispanicization, had a powerful draw. The reality of colonial life in sixteenth-century Peru, however, was infinitely more complex than this trio of racial groups. In particular, additional labels of identity emerged to deal with individuals of mixed race, mestizos being a

prime example. Moreover, cultural distinctions within those three dominant racial groups prove that individuals did not always think of themselves in the terms Spaniards used to describe them.

Many people, both Spaniard and Indian, used ethnicity to distinguish themselves from others of their biological race. Spaniards on the Iberian peninsula had long used religion and culture to differentiate themselves from Jews and Muslims. Native Andeans did the same in preconquest Peru to highlight identities of different native groups such as the Inca royalty, the Lupaca of Lake Titicaca, or the "uncivilized" lowland Chiriguana.[6] But the practice of ethnic distinction changed when the two worlds met in the colonial Andes.

New ethnic identities for urban indigenous people emerged in this era. Remarkably, some of the most common identities had a gendered component. When someone used the word *gatera*, for instance, it connoted an Indian woman who worked in urban markets. Thus, sixteenth-century labels for native Andeans came from occupation as much as ethnic identity. A language of the urban economy emerged because words, phrases, and labels of identity developed a currency in the discourse of the colonial market. If an observer or a customer in the market spoke of an *india palla*, or Inca noblewoman in the Quechua, as opposed to an *india gatera*, the label implied more detail about the relationship of that woman to the colonial economy. These terms, respectively, suggested elite or nonelite status—a "beautiful india from Cuzco" was not so similar to a rural indigenous vendor from Chayanta. Each term connoted a specific identity in the urban economy in Potosí: what women sold, where they sold, the size of their trade ventures, their profits, and, relative to profits, the style and quality of their dress. As urban markets grew and became more